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In recent years, the relationship between venture capitalists (VCs) and their portfolio
ﬁrms has attracted signiﬁcantly increasing attention in the popular press but also in
academic research. One of the major questions in that respect is whether there exists,
after controlling for ﬁrm characteristics, an optimal corporate governance design between
the portfolio ﬁrm and its investor (the VC) or, whether we observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences
most notably across countries but as well across VC ﬁrms and types which prevail over
time. By focusing on the contractual design between VCs and portfolio ﬁrms, we address
the latter issue in detail and the former issue indirectly.
We concentrate on two main, speciﬁc questions. First, do diﬀerent types of VCs (i.e.
bank-dependent, public or independent VCs) negotiate diﬀerent types of contracts when
ﬁnancing the same type of ﬁrms or are observed diﬀerences in contractual design across
diﬀerent VCs only due to the fact that diﬀerent VCs select diﬀerent ﬁrms? That is, we
want to disentangle observed diﬀerences in the design of contracts between VCs and their
portfolio ﬁrms into ﬁrm selection eﬀects and actual diﬀerences in the corporate governance
approaches between VC types. Second, depending on the answer of the ﬁrst question we
ask how precisely the diﬀerences across VC types (of either contractual design and/or
selected ﬁrms) look like.
In a ﬁrst step, we address these questions by building up a stylized theoretical model
which allows for separation and pooling of ﬁrms ﬁnanced by diﬀerent VCs. This modelling
approach enables us to derive testable hypotheses concerning the equilibrium behavior of
VC ﬁrms. In a second step, we use a hand-collected German data set to respond to
our main research questions. This data set consists of all the contractual details of VC
investments into 290 entrepreneurial ﬁrms and covers the period from 1990 to 2004. We
make use of various matching procedures to separate the selection eﬀect from the pure
VC type eﬀect.
The fact that our data sample stems from the German VC market turns out to be
very beneﬁcial for our purpose. This particular market is, due to institutional reasons,
populated by a rich variety of VC types with each type having a signiﬁcant market share.
This enables us to analyze ﬁrm selection and contract choice of diﬀerent VC types properly
on a broad enough data base with suﬃcient observations for most VC types. Moreover,
it has the indirect eﬀect that we are able to take a closer look on the diﬀerences in
contractual design between the US – a fully developed VC market – and Germany – a
yet immature but fast developing market – (see e.g. Bascha and Walz (2002) and Kaplan
et al. (2003)) by asking to what degree the observed aggregate diﬀerences are due to a
diﬀerent structure of the respective VC markets as to their VC type composition.
The growing empirical research on venture capital issues normally limits to take into
1account a potential VC type eﬀect (regarding contract design, investment behavior, ac-
tive engagement as well as performance) by using diﬀerent (often quite rough) dummy
variables. Moreover, there also exist some papers which partially analyze the market
segmentation between diﬀerent types of VCs (see section 2 for details). Our matching
approach points in the same direction, but goes one signiﬁcant step beyond. Rather than
only testing for the signiﬁcance of such a VC type dummy, we are able to elaborate much
further the details of such diﬀerences. We are able to explore in detail the very nature
of these diﬀerences by identifying simultaneously the diﬀerences with respect to contract
choice (which VC types use which particular aspect of the contract to what extent?) or
the choice of ﬁrms (what type of ﬁrm with which characteristics is selected?). Thus we
are able to give a comprehensive view about the diﬀerences between the VC types.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. We ﬁnd a crucial market segmentation between
the diﬀerent VC types (public VCs, bank-dependent VCs and independent VCs) which is
mainly driven by the innovativeness of the project: the more innovative the entrepreneurial
venture, the more probable is ﬁnancing by an independent VC with respect to the other
two VC types. This market segmentation seems to be inﬂuenced by potential strategic
considerations of the VCs as well as the need of the VC’s expertise by the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm. Moreover, we ﬁnd that for similar ﬁrms, the VC’s corporate governance approaches
diﬀer signiﬁcantly: independent VCs use signiﬁcantly more contract mechanisms which
induce active intervention than do bank-dependent VCs. They, in turn, use signiﬁcantly
more of these mechanisms than do public VCs. As concerns control mechanisms, these
diﬀerences are less pronounced. This last result has important implications for cross-
country comparisons as it shows that observed diﬀerences in contract design may be
rather due to diﬀerences in the market composition of the respective VC industries than
to actual diﬀerences in the behavior of speciﬁc VC types.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a detailed literature
review on (theoretical as well as empirical) research focusing in particular on the behavior
of diﬀerent VC types as well as on their diﬀering objectives. In the third section, we develop
a stylized model. We analyze the equilibrium behavior of three diﬀerent VC types and
derive testable hypotheses which form the basis for our subsequent empirical analysis. The
data set which we use in our empirical investigation is described in the fourth section. The
empirical method applied in our paper is discussed in the ﬁfth section. The sixth section
contains our empirical analysis in which we aim to address our leading questions. In the
last section, we conclude.
22 Literature Review
Our analysis is closely related to two branches of the literature: ﬁrst, the literature which
examines the diﬀerent modes of venture capital ﬁnancing focusing on the objectives and
characteristics of diﬀerent ﬁnanciers and the matching between them and diﬀerent types of
ﬁrms; and second, the rather recent literature which empirically analyzes venture capital
and private equity contracts. In what follows, we want to review these two strands of the
literature.
Before looking into the main diﬀerences between VC types and the consequences on the
governance of the ﬁnanced ventures, it deﬁnitively helps to survey the main pros and cons
of VC ﬁnancing per se relative to other sources of ﬁnancing for young ﬁrms – most notably
banks. Studies analyzing this relationship typically start from the perception of VCs as
being active (hands-on) investors which provide risk capital for entrepreneurial ﬁrms (see
e.g. Landier (2004)). The more active involvement of VCs compared to e.g. bank ﬁnancing
is considered to be not only restricted to a more active engagement during the investment
phase of the VC but also during the selection process. In this spirit, Berkovitch and Levy
(2004) show within the framework of a search model that in market equilibrium, matching
is partially mixed: venture capitalists may ﬁnance high and low added value projects while
other ﬁnanciers receive only low value added ones. Alike, Ueda (2004) develops a model of
entrepreneurial ﬁnance where there exist two types of ﬁnanciers: venture capitalists and
banks. While venture capitalists are well informed, banks are not. But venture capitalists
may appropriate the ﬁrm’s idea while banks can not do that. Within this framework,
she shows that projects ﬁnanced through venture capitalists are larger and exhibit higher
returns, higher growth and higher risk. In a similar way, Chemmanur and Chen (2003)
investigate the choice between VC ﬁnancing and angel ﬁnancing. In their framework, VCs
distinguish themselves not only by adding value to ﬁrms but also by possessing private
information. They ﬁnd that a separation of ﬁrms between angel and VC ﬁnancing may
occur only if neither of the two ﬁnancing modes is very scarce. If this is not the case,
however, i.e. if one source of ﬁnancing is in very short supply, diﬀerent types of ﬁrms seek
and receive the respective alternative source of ﬁnancing. In addition, they show that a
particular ﬁrm may receive capital from diﬀerent sources (angel and VC) over its life time.
In all these studies, venture capitalists are to be considered independent venture capi-
talists which only aim to maximize their monetary returns net of costs. There are, however,
VC types which – with respect to their governance as well as with regard to their objec-
tives – diﬀer from this prototype of an independent VC. We can diﬀerentiate three types
of VCs other than independent VCs: corporate VCs (or sometimes referred to as captive
VCs (see Hellmann (2002)), i.e. VC ﬁrms owned by a strategic investor), bank-dependent
VCs (owned by a bank), and public VCs (ﬁnanced mainly with public money). For our
3analysis, two questions are especially important when looking at these diﬀerent types of
VCs: What are the main motives of each speciﬁc type and when is it selected as source
of ﬁnancing?
Besides independent VCs, corporate VCs have attracted the most attention. They
are considered to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from independent VCs with respect to their
objectives. Indeed, despite the often highlighted diﬀerences in corporate VCs’ objectives
(see e.g. Birkinshaw et al. (2002)), there is a general agreement that these objectives fall
into two categories, namely strategic and ﬁnancial objectives (see Chesbrough (2002) and
Siegel et al. (1988)). Gompers and Lerner (2000) – who have been among the ﬁrst who
have studied corporate VCs by comparing them to independent VCs – show that the
strategic interest of corporate VCs in their portfolio ﬁrm has some advantages but also
some costs. They ﬁnd in their empirical analysis that corporate venture investments in
entrepreneurial ﬁrms appear to be at least as successful as those backed by independent
venture organizations. Their data further indicates that corporate investments are made
at a premium reﬂecting the indirect beneﬁts of the strategic complementarities between
the strategic investor and the portfolio ﬁrm. Building on the idea of complementarities
between the entrepreneurial ﬁrm and the corporation backing the VC, Hellmann (2002)
shows in his model that if the new venture is a complement (substitute) the entrepreneur
selects the corporate (independent) VC1. He also points out that the choice of the VC
type has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the relationship and the general design of the contract
between the new venture and the VC. The same ﬁnding emerges from De Bettignies and
Chemla (2003) who show that entrepreneurs end up with fewer shares and less control
under corporate VC than under independent VC ﬁnancing. In our theoretical model in
the next section, we will use these insights as a starting point to analyze the relation
between the choice of a speciﬁc VC type and the contractual design in more detail.
In contrast to this rather large body of literature, bank-dependent VCs have attracted
only limited attention. The major exception is Hellmann et al. (2004). Their empirical
analysis suggests that banking organizations use their VC subsidiary to build relationships
which are in the long run beneﬁcial for their lending activities. Therefore, bank-dependent
VCs aim at ﬁnancing those ﬁrms which are most likely to generate credit demand in the
future. They show that bank-dependent VCs behave in a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent way than
independent VCs. Bank-dependent VCs invest less often in early rounds and they engage
more in larger deals what reﬂects their desire to invest in ﬁrms which are more close to a
situation where they may demand loans.
Public VCs are typically closely related to promotional programs of governments to
foster the development of young start-up companies. They play a signiﬁcant role in the
1Riyanto and Schwienbacher (2001) argue that the corporation can increase the complementarities by
ﬁnancing the venture via the corporate VC.
4overall VC market (see e.g. OECD (1996)). Not only in Continental European countries,
such as France, Belgium, Italy and Germany, but also in the US2 and in particular in
Canada3, the share of public VCs is signiﬁcant. Secrieru and Vigneault (2004) display an
exception to the general neglect of public VCs in the literature. They investigate the role
of public VCs and ask for the optimal level of advice which should be provided by the
public VC. Thereby, they also highlight potential motives for public engagement in this
market: internalization of externalities arising from innovations, liquidity constraints of
entrepreneurial ﬁrms, and the certiﬁcation role of public venture capital programs (see
also Lerner (2002) on this point). In similar spirit, Hirsch (2005) investigates the eﬀects
of public policy programs which aim at internalizing the external eﬀects stemming from
entrepreneurial innovations on contract design. She shows that the design of the public
intervention scheme may have serious eﬀects on contracting mechanisms between private
agents and may even worsen the resulting allocation.
Rather than looking at the diﬀerences among the various forms of VC types, Tykvova
and Walz (2005) take the diﬀerences for granted and examine the consequences of these
diﬀerences on the portfolio ﬁrms and their performance. In an overall compa-rison of
diﬀerent VCs and the performance of their portfolio ﬁrms in the aftermath of the IPO,
they show that there is indeed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the post-IPO performance of
ﬁrms backed by diﬀerent VC types. With data from the newly emerging IPO market in
Germany, they reveal that ﬁrms backed by independent VCs do signiﬁcantly better in
the post-IPO performance thereby indicating the possibility that in the young German
VC market investors did not take the value-added eﬀects of independent VCs fully into
account4.
Finally, as mentioned, our paper is also related to the line of literature which empir-
ically analyzes the design of VC contracts. By looking at the link between the organi-
zational structure of VCs and the design of the contracts between a speciﬁc type of VC
and its portfolio ﬁrms, our analysis can be seen as a further piece in this rather recent
literature. Starting with the seminal paper of Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2003) who looked
into the main structural elements of US VC contracts against the background of models of
corporate ﬁnance, a number of papers have emerged which have extended this approach
to speciﬁc aspects of VC contracts (see Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2004)) and with respect
to international data sets (see e.g. Kaplan et al. (2003) and Lerner and Schoar (2005)). In
two companion papers, we have analyzed speciﬁc elements of VC contracts on the basis of
2See Lerner (2002) for a comprehensive analysis of various public programs aiming at the venture
capital markets and a discussion of their design.
3Vaillancourt (1997) shows that more than 40 percent of venture capital in Canada in 1994 was
managed by public VCs.
4In a related study, Rindermann (2005) analyzes the performance of ﬁrms before and around the IPO
with a European data sample.
5a detailed and highly representative data sample from Germany (which is also used in this
paper). Bienz and Hirsch (2005) look into the structure and determinants of staged VC
contracts by – among other things – contrasting round ﬁnancing with milestone ﬁnancing.
Bienz and Walz (2005) analyze the determinants of control and decision rights in VC con-
tracts. In all these papers, however, VC types enter, if at all, at most as a dummy on the
right-hand-side of the regression. In contrast, we take a much more elaborate look on the
choice of VC types by ﬁrms and its implications on contract design, thereby representing
a complementary view to the above papers.
3 A Theoretical Analysis
The aim of this section is to develop a stylized model which allows us to discuss the
selection of VCs by portfolio ﬁrms as well as the resulting contractual designs in the
respective relationships. We build our model on the stylized facts from the mentioned
literature, i.e. the diﬀerences in the objectives and characteristics between VC types. This
procedure allows us to explain the observed market segmentation and derive, at the same
time, the determinants of the resulting contractual designs.
We allow for three diﬀerent types of VCs endowed with funds to ﬁnance the projects of
three diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. As to the VCs, we distinguish – with regard to our empirical
analysis – independent VCs (IVCs), bank-dependent VCs (BVCs) and public VCs (PVCs).
The VC types diﬀer with respect to their ability to provide advice for the ﬁrms and to
monitor them. We model both activities as a dichotomous variable. That is, control c may
take two realizations, either c = 0 (no control) or c = ¯ c (control). The same holds true
for advice a, i.e. a ∈ {0,¯ a}. PVCs do not have a technology to provide neither advice nor
monitoring. Their respective costs are CPV C(¯ c) = CPV C(¯ a) = ∞. Independent VCs are
specialized in both activities with cost functions CIV C(¯ c) = k and CIV C(¯ a) = e. BVCs
have prohibitive costs for providing advice (CBV C(¯ a) = ∞) and their control technology
is inferior to the one of IVCs but superior to the one of PVCs: CBV C(¯ c) = αk (α > 1).
There are three types of ﬁrms (or projects) which diﬀer in their riskiness and the degree
of innovation. We will refer to them as (in order of declining innovative- and riskiness)
θ1, θ2, and θ3. All projects require funds I in order to get started. In case of failure, all
projects earn Π (Π < I). Whereas proﬁts are the same across projects in the case of
failure, proﬁts diﬀer in the case of success. The more innovative the project is, the higher
proﬁts are in case of success: ¯ Π(θ1) > ¯ Π(θ2) > ¯ Π(θ3). The probabilities of success diﬀer
across projects, but are also dependent on the degree of monitoring and advice. Overall,
we delineate the order of riskiness by assuming for the respective probabilities:
(1) p(θ1,¯ a,c) < p(θ2,a,¯ c) < p(θ3,a,c) ∀a,c.
6For θ1-projects, advice is essential and control has, if advice is given to the ﬁrm, a pos-
itive impact, i.e. p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) > p(θ1,¯ a,0) > p(θ1,0,c) = 0 ∀c. Moreover, we assume that
the inﬂuence of additional control is limited: p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0) ≤ p(θ1,¯ a,0). For θ2-
projects control is essential and advice has, if the ﬁrm is monitored, a positive impact, i.e.
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) > p(θ2,0,¯ c) > p(θ2,a,0) = 0 ∀a. This additional impact is, however, smaller
than for θ1-projects: p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0) > p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ2,0,¯ c). For θ3-projects nei-
ther advice nor control increase the probability of success, i.e. p(θ3,0,0) = p(θ3,a,c) >
0 ∀a,c.
PVCs and BVCs are able to extract additional indirect beneﬁts from their engagement
in the portfolio ﬁrms. While the BVCs are geared towards future credit business for their
mother companies (see on this motivation Hellmann et al. (2004)), PVCs – due to their
public mandate – aim at nonmonetary beneﬁts from the venture (e.g. their ability to
create jobs or to allow for (technology) spill-overs into other segments of the economy). In
a nutshell, this implies that the total payoﬀs of the diﬀerent VCs from their engagement
in a particular ﬁrm i can be written as:
(2) ΠIV C = pi ¯ wi + (1 − pi)wi − k − e − I
(in case the IVC monitors and provides advice) and
(3) ΠBV C = pi(¯ wi + B) + (1 − pi)wi − αk − I
(in case the BVC monitors but does not provide advice) and
(4) ΠPV C = pi ¯ wi + (1 − pi)wi + P − I
(in case the PVC does not provide neither advice nor monitoring)
whereby wi and ¯ wi denote the monetary payoﬀs of the VC in the case of failure and
success of the venture. We restrict these payoﬀs to positive levels. The indirect payoﬀs of
the BVC only arise in the case of success (in which subsequent bank-ﬁnancing is feasible)
while the spill-over eﬀect in the PVCs’ objective function denoted by P occurs in any
case. We assume that for θ1- and θ2-projects joint advice and control (even at the higher
BVC costs of control) is socially beneﬁcial, i.e.:
(5) [p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)][Π(θ1) − Π] ≥ k
(6) p(θ1,¯ a,0)
¯ Π(θ1) − Π

≥ e
(7) [p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ2,0,¯ c)]
¯ Π(θ2) − Π

≥ e
(8) p(θ2,0,¯ c)
¯ Π(θ2) − Π

≥ αk
7Obviously, given our above assumptions, it is optimal to neither exert control nor to
provide advice for θ3-projects.
All projects, given optimal advice and monitoring activities (denoted by stars), are
at least proﬁtable. In addition we assume that θ1- and θ2-projects are so proﬁtable that
their net social payoﬀs exceed Π. That is:
[1 − p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)]Π + p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)¯ Π(θ1) − I − e
∗ − k
∗ ≥ Π (9)
[1 − p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)]Π + p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)¯ Π(θ2) − I − e
∗ − k
∗ ≥ Π (10)
[1 − p(θ3,0,0)]Π + p(θ3,0,0)¯ Π(θ3) − I ≥ 0 (11)
In addition, we impose two technical assumptions
(12)
p(θ1,¯ a,0)[p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)]
[p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ2,0,¯ c)]p(θ2,0,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)[p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)]
[I − Π] ≤ k ≤
[p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)]
2
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
¯ Π(θ1) − Π

(13) Π(θ1) − Π ≥
p(θ1,¯ a,0)p(θ2,0,¯ c)
[(p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − (p(θ2,0,¯ c)](p(θ2,0,¯ c) − [p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)]p(θ1,¯ a,0)]
1
[(p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)]
[I − Π]
The sequence of decisions is as follows.
- In the ﬁrst stage, nature decides on the project type and the entrepreneur ﬁnds out
about the type of his own project.
- In the second stage, the diﬀerent VC types simultaneously oﬀer contracts to the
entrepreneur. In each group of VCs, perfect competition prevails.
- The third stage is characterized by the entrepreneurs’ choices of the VC types and
the contracts as well as by the VCs investing I.
- In stage 4, the VCs learn about the project type.
- Afterwards, in stage 5, they choose their eﬀort levels.
- And, in stage 6, the projects pay oﬀ a certain level of cash ﬂow and the contracts
will be realized.
We will focus in the following on contracts which emerge from a separating set-up (i.e.
ﬁrms never choose contracts designed for other ﬁrms) in which the VCs earn zero proﬁts
8(due to competition). We concentrate on ﬁrst-best results and ask whether these contracts
actually do form a separating equilibrium. In addition, we investigate – in cases where
these optimal contracts do not result – whether another separating perfect Bayesian equi-
librium may arise and how it looks like. Throughout our entire discussion we concentrate
only on contracts which lead to zero-proﬁts for VCs. Given competition in the second
stage of the game (and given that we do not want to derive the entire universe of poten-
tial equilibria, but rather want to focus on whether particular contracts are equilibrium
contracts), this is rather straightforward. To be more precise, using the proﬁt functions
of the VCs (see eqs. (2), (3), and (4)) we get the following payoﬀ structures:
(14) w(θi)IV C =
k∗ + e∗ + I − [1 − p(θi,a∗
i,c∗
i)]w(θi)ICV
p(θi,a∗
i,c∗
i)
(15) w(θi)BV C =
α · k∗ + I − [1 − p(θi,0,c∗
i)]w(θi)BV C
p(θi,0,cα
i )
− B
(16) w(θi)PV C =
I − [1 − p(θi0,0)]w(θi)PV C − P
p(θi,0,0)
whereby the stars denote the eﬃcient levels of advice and control eﬀorts and costs.
Against the background of this focus, we ﬁnd the following for the ﬁfth stage of our
game (in stage six only nature moves). Note that w(θi)IV C is the return the IVC has
demanded in the case of contracts designed for θi-projects.
Lemma 1 ...
1) For θ1-projects:
i) BVCs and PVCs will always choose a = 0 = c independent of contract design.
ii) For an IVC choosing c = ¯ c and a = 0 for θ1-projects never pays oﬀ. IVCs
will provide advice (even without monitoring) for θ1-projects having chosen
θm-contracts (m ∈ [1,2]) if w(θm)IV C ≤ I+k+e−
p(θm,a,c)
p(θ1,a,0)e prevails . The IVC
monitors the ﬁrm (in the presence of the provision of advice) if w(θm)IV C ≤
I + k + e −
p(θm,¯ a,¯ c)
p(θ1,a,c)−p(θ1,a,0)k. If monitoring pays, providing advice is always
worthwhile.
2) For θ2-projects
i) BVCs always choose a = 0 and c = c. PVCs always opt for a = 0 = c.
ii) IVCs will monitor (in the absence of advice) if w(θ2)IV C ≤ I+k+e−
p(θ2,a,c)
p(θ2,0,c)k in
case a θ2-project has chosen the contract designed for its type. If it has selected
9a contract designed for θ1-projects, the IVC will always monitor. The IVC will
provide advice (in the presence of control activities) for θ2-projects having cho-
sen θm-contracts if w(θm)IV C ≤ I +k+e−
p(θm,a,c)
p(θ2,a,c)−p(θ2,0,c)e. If providing advice
pays for θ2-projects with θm-contracts monitoring is always pay-oﬀ increasing
for the IVC.
3) For θ3-projects all VC types will always choose a = 0 = c independent of contract
design.
Proof 1 See Appendix.
With the help of Lemma 1, we can now address the main part of the model, namely
the selection of VCs and contracts by the entrepreneurs. As already mentioned, we focus
on the existence of a separating equilibrium and derive conditions under which such a
separating equilibrium emerges and show how it precisely looks like. We state for the
equilibrium of stage three of the game:
Proposition 1 ...
1) θ1-projects will always choose to be ﬁnanced by an IVC anticipating active advice
and control.
2) i) θ2-projects may either select an IVC or a BVC.
ii) With e ≤ e1 and α ≤ α1,θ2-projects are ﬁnanced by a BVC anticipating active
control but no advice.
iii) With e ≤ e1 and α > α1, θ2-projects select an IVC anticipating active control
and advice.
iv) With e > e1 and α ≤ α2, θ2-projects select an BVC anticipating control but no
advice.
v) With e > e1 and α > α2, θ2-entrepreneurs select an IVC anticipating control
but no advice.
3) θ3-projects will always select a PVC for their ﬁnancing needs anticipating neither
advice nor control.
whereby α1 ≡ 1+
p(θ2,0,c)·B
k + e
k −
p(θ2,a,c)−p(θ2,0,c)
k

Π(θ2) − Π

; e1 ≡
p(θ2,a,c)−p(θ2,0,c)
p(θ1,a,c)−p(θ1,a,0)k, and
α2 = 1 +
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
k B.
Proof 2 See Appendix.
10That is, we have a clear separation of θ1- and θ3-projects which are ﬁnanced by IVCs and
PVCs. Only with θ2-projects, we have two outcomes: these projects are either ﬁnanced
by an IVC or a BVC. In the latter case, it may happen that the contracts oﬀered to θ2-
projects are structurally (with respect to the implied provision of advice and monitoring)
diﬀerent (see Proposition 1, 2ii) and iii)) or the same (see Proposition 1, 2iv) and v)) .
Given this result, we can now turn to the contract design stage of the game. Perfect
competition among the VCs in each group implies undercutting and leads to zero proﬁts
for the VC. Due to the binary nature of the cashﬂows stemming from the diﬀerent projects,
and the fact that there are no other contractable variables besides realized cashﬂows, the
optimal contract(s) will entail potentially two diﬀerent pay-oﬀ levels which are contingent
on the realized cashﬂows. Let us delineate these cashﬂows in case of success (failure) of
the projects by w(θi)j (w(θi)j) whereby θi denotes the project type for which the contract
is designed for while j (IVC, PVC, BVC) stands for the VC type oﬀering the contract.
Using Proposition 1 we can state (and thereby justify our initial assumption):
Proposition 2 ...
The diﬀerent VC types will oﬀer contracts which just break even. The wage structure (each
implying potentially a continuum of contracts) is depicted in (14), (15), and (16).
Proposition 4.2 basically describes the zero-proﬁt nature of the equilibrium contracts.
The absolute values are determined by the need to create incentive-compatibility and
to ensure that a separating equilibrium actually emerges. Since they are by and large
irrelevant for our purposes, we have decided to shift this analysis and the related discussion
in the Appendix (i.e. in the proof of Proposition 1).
Using our above results enables us to deduce general hypotheses (mainly by using
Proposition 1) concerning the selection of VC ﬁrms by entrepreneurs and the design of
the respective contracts. First of all, we have to note that PVCs will ﬁnance only θ3-
projects and that these projects always choose PVCs. Second, we ﬁnd that BVCs ﬁnance,
if at all, θ2-projects. IVCs in contrast, may ﬁnance θ1- as well as θ2-projects.
Therefore we can state our ﬁrst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 ...
We expect a selection eﬀect in the sense that there exists a correlation between the in-
novativeness of the project and the ﬁnancing by means of diﬀerent VC types. The least
innovative projects are ﬁnanced by PVCs. BVCs ﬁnance projects with an intermediate
level of innovation. Finally, we expect that the higher the degree of innovation the more
likely it is that these projects are ﬁnanced by IVCs.
Furthermore, if we let control costs k to stay constant across time (i.e. diﬀerent stages of
maturity of the VC market) and assume advice costs to vary with market maturity (the
more mature the market, the lower e), we can state the following hypotheses:
11Hypothesis 2 ...
In mature markets (i.e. with lower e) diﬀerent VC types ﬁnancing the same type of ﬁrms
design diﬀerent contracts for these ﬁrms (see Proposition 1, 2ii) and 2iii)).
Hypothesis 3 ...
In less mature markets (i.e. with a higher e) diﬀerent VC types ﬁnancing potentially the
same type of ﬁrms design the same type of contracts for these ﬁrms (see Proposition 1,
2iv) and 2v)).
4 The Data Set
4.1 Sample and Sample Selection Issues
Our analysis uses a proprietary, hand-collected data set from KfW based on contracts
between VCs and their portfolio ﬁrms. KfW has a unique position in Germany’s venture
capital market: being Germany’s largest promotional bank, it supports innovative ﬁrms
by promoting the investment of the VCs. Although, in our sample, KfW never directly
invests in any of the portfolio ﬁrms, it becomes indirectly involved in the venture capital
deals in Germany. In order to obtain support from KfW, VCs have to apply by submitting
the key details of their relationship with the portfolio ﬁrm, most notably, the term sheets,
the business plans and the shareholder’s agreements. By providing us with access to these
documents, KfW gave us the unique opportunity to collect detailed information on the
relationship between the VC and its portfolio ﬁrm based on actual contract data.
In order to reduce the very time-intensive task of collecting detailed information from
the numerous documents to a manageable size, we drew a random sample of 300 portfolio
ﬁrms5. We categorized each portfolio company into one of three classes with respect to
their investment date (before 1998, between 1998 and 2000, and after 2000) and eight
classes with respect to the program or program combination through which their VC
investor was supported by KfW. This categorization was undertaken with the objective
to achieve a balanced representation of the population. Table 1 gives an overview about
our sample and the support programs considered. Unfortunately, the data for 10 portfolio
companies could not be evaluated. Therefore, our random sample ﬁnally consists of 290
portfolio companies that were ﬁnanced in 464 investment rounds between 1990 and 2004.
In this study, we will limit to ﬁrst rounds in order to focus on the choice of a speciﬁc VC
type and the initial contract design and blind out temporal eﬀects in contract design.
We are conﬁdent that we do not have any major bias in the selection of our sample
5We drew this sample out of the population of all portfolio ﬁrms that were ﬁnanced by venture
capitalists which, in turn, were supported by KfW via one of the programmes mentioned in table 1.
12for two reasons. Firstly, as we were responsible for the sample selection process ourselves,
we ensured that no selection bias occurred via the provider of all our documents (KfW)
by drawing a random sample of all VC ﬁnanced portfolio companies supported by KfW.
Secondly, KfW supported a large proportion of the population of all investments realized
by the German venture capital industry in the time period under consideration6. This
means that we have a representative sample of the German VC industry. One obvious
selection bias which we were not able to circumvent is the fact that we are concentrating
on one particular geographic region (Germany) and the associated venture capital market.
To a lesser degree this is true for the time period. We take all this into consideration by
interpreting our data sample as the description of a situation of a young and evolving
venture capital market.
As concerns the process of data collection, for each investment round, we evaluated
the company’s balance sheet data and its business plan to get information with respect
to the market position of the company and details about the ﬁnanced project. Moreover,
we took from the term sheet and the shareholder’s agreement detailed information about
the security design, the timing and conditions of the investment, the syndication of the
investment, control and information rights of the venture capitalists and exit covenants.
We translated this information into quantiﬁable variables. Finally, we complemented the
data set with information about the venture capitalist supported by KfW. Overall, we
gained a detailed picture of the control and information rights embedded in these contracts
as well as of the characteristics of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm, the founder(s) and the venture
capitalists involved.
As usual in this type of studies, we were confronted with the problem that not al-
ways all data were available. Thus the number of observations may vary depending on
the variable studied. Typically, the amount invested and valuations were the most reli-
able variables whereas information on staging or investment memoranda were sometimes
missing. Still, we do not see a systematic selection bias problem because there are several
reasons for missing data. On the one hand, data may be missing for very young ﬁrms but,
on the other hand, we often had also the most exhaustive term sheets for these ﬁrms.
4.2 Variable Descriptions
In what follows, we describe the data set in more detail and introduce the variables
necessary for our regressions. Please note that all balance sheet data as well as exogenous
factors such as the state of product development is information that is known to the VC
and the entrepreneur before they sign the contract.
6According to BVK (2003a) and (2003b), there were 11854 seed, start-up and expansion deals by
its members in the relevant time period; KfW supported almost 7100 deals of potential members. This
implies a market coverage of approximately 60%.
13Firm Characteristics
We have information about the project and the respective portfolio company. We ob-
serve the ﬁrm’s industry and create a dummy variable GROWTH INDUSTRIES which
takes value one if the ﬁrm is active in the life-science area, the internet industry or the
IT/telecommunication branch. If the ﬁrm belongs to a traditional industry or another
industry the dummy takes value zero.
Furthermore, we observe the ﬁrm’s development stage in each ﬁnancing round. First,
we have information about the ﬁrm’s development stage as deﬁned by the German Ven-
ture Capital Association. We distinguish seed and start-up ﬁrms on the one hand, and
expansion and later stage ﬁrms on the other hand: the dummy EARLY STAGE indicates
whether the ﬁrm belongs to the ﬁrst group or not. Second, we have balance sheet infor-
mation from the year preceding the closing date of the corresponding ﬁnancing round.
We know whether the ﬁrm has an audited balance sheet (in this case the dummy AU-
DITED BALANCE SHEET takes value one); we observe the ﬁxed asset ratio (FAR) that
indicates the ratio of ﬁxed assets to balance sheet total7; and we know whether the ﬁrm
has reached its break-even point what is captured by the dummy BREAK EVEN. Third,
we have information about the ﬁrm’s achievements. We know whether the ﬁrm has ﬁn-
ished its product tests; whether it already has a ﬁnished product; whether the ﬁrm holds
any patents or if it even has reference customers. We create a dummy variable FINISHED
PRODUCT which signals the existence of a product and gives us concrete information
about the development stage of the ﬁrm.
Finally, we observe whether the ﬁrm already received ﬁnancing from banks or other
VCs prior to the observed investment round. More concretely, we deﬁne a dummy PRE-
VIOUS OUTSIDE FINANCE that takes value one if the portfolio company has received
bank, angel or other VC ﬁnance before the ﬁrst round of VC ﬁnancing we are looking at.
VC, Entrepreneur and Investment Characteristics
Second, we have information about the VC, the entrepreneur and the investment charac-
teristics. We classify each VC according to his type into four categories named INTER-
NATIONAL INDEPENDENT VC, LOCAL INDEPENDENT VC, BANK-DEPENDENT VC
and PUBLIC VC.
Moreover, we have information about the entrepreneurs running the portfolio ﬁrm. We
7As we have many missing values in our sample, we adopt the following procedure. For all ﬁrms in
a ﬁrst ﬁnancing round, with an age of less than one year at the date of contracting, and an investment
phase of seed or early, we set the ﬁxed asset ratio to zero. If we lack information for higher rounds, we
use the same ratio as in the round before. If this ratio is not available, we code both as missing values.
Additionally, we do not resort to the preceding round in the case of second rounds where we coded the
ﬁrst round data to be zero.
14know if any of the founders has a PhD or higher degree of education, we observe whether
any of the founders has a background in engineering or natural sciences and we know
whether we face a repeat entrepreneur, i.e. someone who has already run a ﬁrm. This last
aspect is captured by the dummy variable REPEAT ENTREPRENEUR.
Finally, we have information about the investment itself. We observe the year when the
ﬁnancing round is closed and deﬁne three time dummies. PERIOD 1 takes value one if the
ﬁnancing round is closed during the early period of relatively low venture capital activity,
namely before 1998, PERIOD 2 if it is closed during the boom, i.e. between 1998 and 2000
and PERIOD 3 if it is closed after 2000 – a period of relative decline and reorganization
of the venture capital industry. In addition, we observe the total amount invested, the
ﬁnancing instrument used and the timing of the investment.
Contract Elements
Most importantly, we were able to evaluate the contracts between the VC which was sup-
ported by KfW and its portfolio company. We focus on ﬁve major contracting elements
which we quantify by creating the following variables. First, we create the variable IN-
CENTIVE MECHANISM DEGREE. This variable measures the extent of incentives which
the VC gets by means of the design of his cash-ﬂow rights. Based on the theoretical liter-
ature on optimal security design in venture capital frameworks with a double-sided moral
hazard problem (see, for example Casamatta (2003) or Schmidt (2003)), we deﬁne this
variable in the following way: it takes value zero with nonstandard debt and pure debt,
value 1 with debt-equity mixes where the debt component is larger than the equity com-
ponent, value two with debt-equity mixes where the debt component is smaller than the
equity component, value three with pure equity and equity with a liquidation preference,
and value four with convertibles8.
Second, we observe the percentage of voting rights which are hold by the VC9. We
create a further categorial variable VOTING RIGHTS which takes value zero if the VC
does not hold any voting rights, value one for the interval (0,25%), value two for [25%,
50%) and value three for [50%, 100%]. The intervals were formed on the basis of the
speciﬁc thresholds which are necessary to be able to decide about diﬀerent categories of
ﬁrm aﬀairs.
Third, we observe whether the VC holds veto rights or not. We distinguish operational
and structural veto rights. OPERATIONAL VETO RIGHTS is a categorial variable which
represents the sum of the veto rights that govern the entrepreneur’s actions in the ﬁrm:
8For the rules of classiﬁcation of the mentioned securities see table 3.
9In case that the VC supported by KfW syndicates, the data for the following contract elements refer
to the whole syndicate. We adopt this procedure because due to our understanding of the data set, we
conjecture that he is the decisive VC.
15the veto right against changes in the ﬁrm’s line of business, the veto against certain
ﬁnancial decisions such as capital expenditures or the use of derivative instruments, the
veto against changes in the ﬁrm’s head count and veto rights against other decisions, i.e.
against lawsuits on behalf of the ﬁrm. STRUCTURAL VETO RIGHTS is the sum of the
veto rights that secure the VC’s position in the ﬁrm: the veto right against changes in the
shareholder’s agreement, the veto that forbids the ﬁrm’s dissolution and the veto against
changes in the ﬁrm’s capital structure such as giving out new shares.
Finally, we deﬁne a dummy variable LIQUIDATION RIGHTS which takes value one if
one of the following elements which gives the VC an exit option is observed: pure debt or
non-standard debt, a put option or staging.
5 Matching: A Discussion of Methodological Issues
5.1 Foundations
We aim at analyzing whether diﬀerent VC types pursue distinct corporate governance
approaches. We cannot attribute, however, the observed diﬀerences in contract design
directly to diﬀerences in the corporate governance approaches. This would only be the
case if the group of ﬁrms which is ﬁnanced by one VC type or another would be random.
Though, throughout this paper, we assume that the choice of a speciﬁc VC type is the
result of underlying utility maximization by the respective ﬁrm and thus the group of ﬁrms
is rather actively selected. Consequently, econometric methods which allow identifying the
real diﬀerences in the VC approaches are necessary. One such method is matching which
we will apply in this study.
Our problem can be stated as follows (see Lechner (2002)): We consider a world with
4 diﬀerent VC types (PVC, BVC, LIVC and IIVC) and we will refer to the ﬁnancing by
each VC type as one speciﬁc treatment D with D ∈ {PV C,BV C,LIV C,IIV C}. The
potential outcomes in each treatment (in our case the contract design with ﬁnancing by
each speciﬁc VC type) are denoted by {YPV C,YBV C,YLIV C,YIIV C}10. In order to answer
our research question, we want to identify the diﬀerences in contract design between VC
type i and VC type j for all ﬁrms ﬁnanced by VC type i. These pairwise average treatment
eﬀects on the treated are given by
(17) ATT = E[Yi − Yj|D = i] = E[Yi|D = i] − E[Yj|D = i] for i,j ∈ D,i 6= j
However, as every ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by only one VC type, only the ﬁrst term is observed in
the data. The second term is unobservable - we are confronted with a problem of missing
10This notation already assumes that the treatment choice of one ﬁrm does not have an inﬂuence on
the outcome of the other ﬁrms (stable-unit-treatment-assumption). When we assume that the supply of
funds by one speciﬁc VC type is not scarce, this assumption holds in our context.
16data. In order to overcome this problem, identifying assumptions are necessary. In the
evaluation literature, diﬀerent assumptions and therefore diﬀerent econometric methods
are used11. One assumption is the unconfoundness assumption which requires that all
confounding variables X, i.e. all variables which jointly determine both the choice of a
speciﬁc VC type and the contract design, are available in the data set. Formally, the
unconfoundness assumption states that all potential treatment outcomes are independent
of the VC choice for any given vector of confounding variables X12:
(18) D ⊥ (YPV C,YBV C,YLIV C,YIIV C)|X
This means that for ﬁrms which are equal with respect to all confounding variables the
choice of a speciﬁc VC type is random and thus, the diﬀerences in contract design between
diﬀerent VC types can be attributed to their diﬀerent corporate governance approaches.
In our context, contracts between the VC and the portfolio ﬁrm are written on the
basis of the information available before contracting. This information certainly includes
the market situation, but also ﬁrm characteristics such as the development stage, the
ﬁnancial situation or the industry of the ﬁrm. Finally, it may comprise information about
the entrepreneur(s) of the ﬁrm. The same information should guide the ﬁrm when choosing
a speciﬁc VC type. As our data set contains a large set of variables which describe these
aspects, we think that it is rich enough to identify all confounding variables and thus to
allow for the identiﬁcation of possible diﬀerences in the corporate governance approaches
of the VC types13. Given unconfoundness and using the law of iterated expectations, the
average treatment eﬀect on the treated can then be written as
(19) ATT = E[Yi|D = i] − E[E[Yj|D = j,X]|D = i]
It is obvious that the main challenge continues to be the estimation of the second term.
One possible estimation procedure is matching whose central idea is to simply compare
the contract design between VC type i and VC type j for ﬁrms which are identical with
respect to all confounding variables. Classifying the ﬁrms in diﬀerent cells according to
all characteristics which are reﬂected by the confounding variables may be infeasible,
however: the larger the number of variables in X and the more values each variable can
take, the more cells must be taken into account. Furthermore, if the sample is small, there
may not be suﬃcient ﬁrms ﬁnanced by VC type i or VC type j in each cell (see e.g. Ichino
(2002)).
11See Fr¨ olich (2004) for a survey with respect to multiple treatments and Blundell and Costa Dias
(2002) as concerns binary treatments.
12As we are interested in the pairwise comparison of the treatments, it even suﬃces if this condition
holds only for the respective subsamples which receive ﬁnancing either by VC type i or by VC type j.
13See subsection 6.1 for more details.
17Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) oﬀer a possible solution to this dimensionality problem.
They show (for the case of a binary treatment) that it is equivalent to condition on the
propensity score instead of on all confounding variables. The propensity score is thereby
deﬁned as the conditional probability of receiving the treatment given X:
(20) p(X) = Pr{D = 1|X} = E[D|X]
This is true because the propensity score has two important properties. First, it balances
the attributes X, i.e. D ⊥ X|p(X). This means that ﬁrms with the same propensity score
have the same distribution of X independently of the choice of a speciﬁc VC type, and as
the choice of a speciﬁc VC type is random, they are on average observationally equal. In
turn, this implies that balancing may be achieved without controlling for all interactions of
the single variables in X when estimating the propensity score. Second, if unconfoundness
given X holds, then unconfoundness given p(X) holds as well. Imbens (2000) and Lechner
(2001) generalize these results for the case of multiple treatments.
5.2 Implementation
Before being able to implement matching, some further steps are necessary. In a ﬁrst
step, the propensity scores have to be estimated provided that they are not already given
in the data set. Lechner (2002) shows that in a multiple treatments framework, there
exist two potential estimation strategies. First, binary conditional probabilities (pi|ij(X))
can be estimated for every subsample of ﬁrms ﬁnanced by VC types i and j by using
standard econometric methods as for example probit models. This procedure is relatively
time-consuming because, for example in our case, already 6 diﬀerent models have to be
estimated. On the other hand, the pairwise estimation allows a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of
the diﬀerent models. The second estimation strategy consists in estimating a multinomial
discrete-choice model in order to obtain pi(X)∀i ∈ D and compute afterwards the condi-
tional probabilities pi|ij(X) =
pi(X)
pi(X)+pj(X). As Lechner (2002) shows that the results do not
diﬀer systematically between the two strategies, we will adopt both estimation strategies
in order to check our results for robustness.
In a second step, each treated observation has to be matched with untreated obser-
vations with the same propensity score and the conditional treatment eﬀects need to be
computed. In a last step, the average of these conditional eﬀects must be determined with
respect to the distribution of the propensity score for ﬁrms ﬁnanced by VC type i (see
Ichino (2002)). Though, in practice, this procedure may reveal two important problems.
First, it is quite improbable to ﬁnd a treated and an untreated ﬁrm with exactly
the same propensity score14. One possible solution may be to simply choose the nearest
14This is, in fact, the less probable, the more values the explaining variables can take.
18propensity score. In fact, this procedure is widespread and thus, we will use an adapted
version in this paper, namely tied nearest neighbor matching with replacement. This
method matches each treated observation with the nearest untreated observation in terms
of propensity score and all further untreated observations with identical propensity score.
Thereby, all matched observations are weighted equally. As nearest neighbor matching
is implemented with replacement, each untreated observation may be used repeatedly15.
However, nearest neighbor matching does not approach the trade-oﬀ between bias and
variance inherent in matching: it minimizes the bias, but addresses the variance issue only
afterwards by tied matching.
Therefore, in order to address this trade-oﬀ explicitly, we will also implement Gaussian
kernel matching. With Gaussian kernel matching, the untreated observations are weighted
inversely proportional to their distance from the respective treated observation in terms
of the propensity score. This means that the second term of equation 17 is given by
(21)
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where G(·) is the Gaussian kernel function, h represents the chosen bandwidth and C (T)
refers to all the untreated (treated) observations. As can be seen in the equation, it is
actually the choice of the bandwidth h which aims at balancing bias and variance. There
exist many methods to determine the optimal bandwidth. Silverman (1996), for example,
derives a rule-of-thumb (h = 0.9min[ standard deviation; interquartile range/1.34]n− 1
5)
and shows that for a broad variety of underlying distributions, the so chosen bandwidth
yields an integrated mean squared error which lies within 10% of the optimal one. As this
result is convincing and the method can be easily implemented, we will use his rule to
compute the bandwidths for the respective pairwise comparisons.
The second potential problem is the necessity of suﬃcient overlap between the propen-
sity scores of ﬁrms ﬁnanced by VC type i and j. If this is not guaranteed, there may not
exist adequate matches for some treated observations. One possible solution, which we
will apply in our analysis, is to limit matching to the common support area. This means
that all treated observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or lower
than the minimum propensity score of the untreated observations are not considered. In
this case, it is important to take into account that the ATT can be interpreted only as
the average eﬀect for those treated observations which fall in the common support area.
15This has the negative eﬀect of inﬂating the variance, though it is necessary when handling multiple
treatments with large diﬀerences in the number of observations for the particular treatments as it is the
case in our data set (see Lechner (2002)).
196 Empirical Analysis
When looking at table 4, we can observe crucial diﬀerences in contract design between
the diﬀerent VC types. There is a steady increase in the use of all analyzed contractual
elements except liquidation rights when going from public VCs to bank-dependent VCs
and further to independent VCs with an additional diﬀerence between local and interna-
tional independent VCs16. As to liquidation rights, this order is slightly modiﬁed as public
VCs hold in average more often some kind of liquidation right than bank-dependent VCs.
Moreover, in this case, the diﬀerences are not always signiﬁcant.
These descriptive statistics must be handled with precaution, however, as the diﬀer-
ences cannot be directly ascribed to a diﬀerent behavior of the various VC types. Thus it
is necessary to have a closer look in order to disentangle the potential selection eﬀect and
the diﬀerences in the corporate governance approaches of the diﬀerent VC types. There-
fore, in a ﬁrst step, we aim at identifying the determinants which inﬂuence the choice of a
speciﬁc VC type, and in a second step, we will use diﬀerent matching procedures in order
to obtain the actual diﬀerences in contract design between the VC types.
6.1 Do Diﬀerent VCs Select Diﬀerent Firms?
As pointed out in section 5, it is necessary to estimate conditional probabilities for the
choice of each speciﬁc VC type (propensity scores) in order to be able to implement
matching in a second step. At the same time, this procedure allows us to shed light on
the selection issue. Hypothesis 1 states that there should exist a correlation between the
innovativeness of the project and the ﬁnancing by means of diﬀerent VC types. This is
expected to be the case due to the diﬀerent needs of VC support by the entrepreneurs.
The speciﬁcation of our regression models is driven by the search for the determinants
which jointly inﬂuence VC choice and contract design. As remarked in section 5, we
conjecture that these determinants should limit to information which is available to the
entrepreneur or the VC before contracting. We classify this information into three groups:
market situation, ﬁrm characteristics and track record. In order to control for the market
situation, we will introduce the dummies for the early development of the industry (before
1998) and for the consolidation period (after 2001). With respect to ﬁrm characteristics,
we think that we get a precise image by controlling for the development stage of the ﬁrm,
its asset structure as well as its industry. And ﬁnally, as concerns the track record, we
consider important to know if we are confronted with a repeat entrepreneur or if the ﬁrm
16The diﬀerence between public and bank-dependent VCs is, however, only signiﬁcant in the case of the
strength of the incentive mechanism, and the diﬀerence between local and international independent VCs
is only signiﬁcant in the case of the level of voting and veto rights. Moreover, with respect to operational
veto rights, bank-dependent and local independent VCs do not show a signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
20has already obtained outside ﬁnancing before.
When specifying the diﬀerent models, we have to balance the number of explanatory
variables and the loss of observations due to missing values. This is especially true for our
track record variables which show a relatively high amount of missing values. Therefore,
we will only include them when the descriptive statistics suggest us to do so. Moreover, we
have to avoid multicollinearity problems due to the use of highly correlated explanatory
variables. This aspect is also important when deciding about the inclusion of our track
record variables, especially the previous outside ﬁnancing dummy. Finally, for the same
reasons, we will use the ﬁnished product dummy as proxy for the development stage
of the ﬁrm17. The estimation of the propensity scores by pairwise probit models gives
us the ﬂexibility to address these trade-oﬀs for each model separately whereas with the
multinomial model, we have to opt for one single speciﬁcation – a reason why we exclude
the track record variables.
Interpreting our descriptive statistics and our regression results (see tables 5, 7 and 8)
gives us the following insights into market segmentation between the diﬀerent VC types.
Between the ﬁrms which are ﬁnanced by public VCs are especially few ﬁrms which have
obtained previous outside ﬁnancing compared to all other VC types. For these ﬁrms, it may
be especially diﬃcult to get funding and thus, public VCs may prevent underinvestment.
However, this seems to be the case only when no special expertise is necessary. In fact,
public VCs ﬁnance signiﬁcantly less ﬁrms in growth industries than do independent VCs18.
These ﬁrms can be characterized by exhibiting a higher degree of uncertainty but also
a higher innovation potential and therefore, a key role of strategic decisions which can
be supported by the VC. The need for support is especially crucial if the entrepreneur
has no expertise (i.e. is not repeat entrepreneur). Indeed, public VCs ﬁnance signiﬁcantly
less ﬁrms whose entrepreneur is not a repeat entrepreneur than international independent
VCs19. So hypothesis 1 which states that less innovative projects should be ﬁnanced by
public VCs is conﬁrmed. Moreover, the impact of the need of VC expertise on the choice
of a speciﬁc VC type – as it is modelled in our framework in section 3 – is also conﬁrmed.
The same is true with respect to the importance of strategic objectives, such as the
consideration of the spill-over eﬀect to the rest of the economy by public VCs.
Bank-dependent VCs diﬀer from the other VC types mainly in the fact that their
ﬁrms present a signiﬁcantly higher ﬁxed asset ratio than the ﬁrms ﬁnanced by all other
VC types20. The ﬁxed asset ratio can be interpreted as signal for the risk related to
17Other proxies would induce a higher loss of observations or a higher and therefore potentially prob-
lematic correlation with the ﬁxed asset ratio (see table 6).
18With respect to international independent VCs, this diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant in our descriptive
statistics, however.
19This diﬀerence is, however, not robustly signiﬁcant in our regressions.
20Interestingly, the ﬁxed asset ratio is far from being signiﬁcant in our regression results for the com-
21a speciﬁc investment: if the tangibility of assets is high and the VC has a liquidation
preference, the probability of getting back his investment is relatively high. Moreover,
bank-dependent VCs ﬁnance signiﬁcantly less ﬁrms in growth industries than do indepen-
dent VCs21. Analogously to the case of public VCs, we can again interpret this result as
underlining the fact that bank-dependent VCs rather ﬁnance ﬁrms with a lower degree of
uncertainty and a lower innovation potential and therefore a less pronounced need for VC
support. Finally, the percentage of ﬁrms which have previously obtained outside ﬁnancing
is the highest with bank-dependent VCs – although the diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant in
our descriptive statistics in comparison with public and local independent VCs. Thus to
sum up, we can say that hypothesis 1 is again broadly conﬁrmed.
It is also interesting to look at the diﬀerences between local and international inde-
pendent VCs. The only characteristic which diﬀers signiﬁcantly in both our descriptive
statistics and our regression results is the ﬁxed asset ratio – it is signiﬁcantly lower for in-
ternational independent VCs. But the descriptive statistics underline further – especially
through the diﬀerent means (though not signiﬁcant) as well as through the comparison
to public and bank-dependent VCs – that international independent VCs ﬁnance rather
ﬁrms with a higher degree of uncertainty and a higher innovation potential, in earlier
development stages and for whom their expertise is crucial.
Finally, there exist time eﬀects of market segmentation which are shown in table 2: the
percentage of ﬁrms ﬁnanced by public and bank-dependent VCs drops approximately 50%
from period 1 to period 3 whereas the percentage of local and international independent
VCs almost reduplicated. As we include the period 1 and period 3 dummies in our regres-
sion, only the period 1 dummy is signiﬁcant when comparing international independent
VCs with public and bank-dependent VCs respectively. This is due to the fact that the
percentage of international independent VCs quadruplicated from period 1 to the boom
and then decreased again 50% whereas the evolution of the percentage of all other VC
types was continuous. Our model predicts that the higher the expertise of independent
VCs (and therefore, the lower their costs), the higher should be the percentage of ﬁrms
ﬁnanced by independent VCs and the lower the percentage ﬁnanced by bank-dependent
VCs. This is just what we observe in table 2. Our model does not explain, however, the
decrease in ﬁrms ﬁnanced by public VCs. Nevertheless, when we proceed on the assump-
tion that in period 1, the ﬁnancing of certain ﬁrms was not proﬁtable without considering
the spill-over eﬀect to the rest of the economy due to the low level of expertise of the
VCs but became proﬁtable with the subsequent increase in expertise, this phenomenon
can also be explained.
Thus to conclude, we can say that we observe a pronounced market segmentation
parison with local independent VCs.
21With respect to international independent VCs, this diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant at the 12% level.
22between the diﬀerent VC types which depends crucially on the innovativeness of the
projects. Hypothesis 1 is broadly conﬁrmed: public VCs and bank-dependent VCs rather
ﬁnance less innovative projects whereas the most innovative projects are ﬁnanced by
independent VCs. Moreover, we are able to identify the underlying driving factors for
this kind of segmentation. Firstly, as in our model, the segmentation seems to be due to
the diﬀerences in the objective functions (especially for public VCs) as well as the VC’s
capacity of providing the expertise needed by diﬀerent ﬁrm types; and secondly, it is due
to the maturation of the market.
6.2 Do Diﬀerent VCs Diﬀer with Respect to Their Corporate
Governance Approach?
In order to be able to answer this question and test hypotheses 2 and 3, we have to
disentangle the selection and the treatment eﬀect. To do so, we will run two diﬀerent
matching procedures, namely tied nearest neighbor matching as well as Gaussian kernel
matching – both with the common support restriction22. We base both methods on the
two speciﬁcations of the propensity scores respectively: the propensity scores based on the
pairwise probit models as well as the propensity scores based on the multinomial probit
model. Thus, we will check our results for robustness with respect to the estimation
strategy as well as the implemented matching method.
In order to give the most detailed description of the diﬀerent corporate governance
approaches, we will look at the key contract elements which can be classiﬁed – as in our
model – into two groups : contract elements which allow/incentivize the VC to actively in-
tervene in the ﬁrm – such as the strength of the incentive mechanism and the voting rights
– and control rights, namely operational and structural veto rights as well as liquidation
rights.
Before interpreting the matching results, it is important to assess the matching quality
in order to justify the approach. Suitable indicators for the matching quality are the
following. First, we should observe a substantial decrease in the pseudo-R2 values from
the unmatched to the matched sample, the pseudo-R2 values resulting from a probit
model for each of the two samples with the pairwise VC dummies as endogenous variables
and the identiﬁed covariates (see, for example, Sianesi (2003)). In the same way, a sharp
increase in the p-value of the likelihood ratio test testing for joint insigniﬁcance of all
the covariates should be observed between the unmatched and matched sample in order
to guarantee a good matching quality. And ﬁnally, a reduction of the median of the
standardized bias following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) can also serve as a signal for
the validity of the unconfoundness assumption. Tables 10 and 11 report these diﬀerent
22See section 5 for details on the methods.
23measures for all the possible treatment and comparison group combinations which are
indicated in column two. Moreover, they are reported for both matching methods (tied
nearest neighbor matching (NN) and Gaussian kernel matching (GK), see column one).
Finally, table 10 refers to the matching quality when using the propensity scores based
on the pairwise probit models whereas table 11 refers to the matching quality when using
the propensity scores based on the multinomial probit model.
When looking at these tables, we can observe that we generally achieve a substantial
balancing of the confounding variables: the pseudo-R2 diminishes considerably, the p-
value of the likelihood ratio test increases drastically and the median of the standardized
bias following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) reduces sharply. When we look at table 10 at
the category incentive mechanism degree, for example, we see that for local independent
VCs as treatment group and bank-dependent VCs as control group, the pseudo-R2 before
matching amounts to 0.105 and after matching it decreases to 0.005 with both matching
methods; the p-value of the likelihood ratio test increases from 0.000 to 0.955 or 0.939
depending on the matching method. This means that the confounding variables are not
able anymore to jointly explain the choice of a speciﬁc VC type what was, indeed, the
objective of the matching procedure. Finally, the median of the standardized bias drops
from 29.3 to 2.5 and 5.5 respectively. The last column indicates the loss of observations
due to the common support restriction which is quite low in this case as only 1.73% of
the observations are lost. Only in some cases, the achieved balancing is limited. This is
especially the case when the percentage of observations lost due to the common support
assumption is too high or the comparison group is substantially smaller than the treatment
group (BVC vs. IIVC, LIVC vs. IIVC) or when the total number of observations in the
pairwise comparison is relatively small (PVC vs. IIVC and BVC). In these cases, it is less
probable to ﬁnd adequate controls for the treated observations. As we interchange the
treated and control units for each pairwise comparison in order to compare the corporate
governance approaches for the two portfolios of ﬁrms ﬁnanced by each VC respectively,
in the majority of cases with limited balancing, we are anyhow able to get some insights
– though only for one respective portfolio23.
Table 9 indicates the diﬀerences in the means of the single contracting elements before
matching, i.e. before disentangling the selection and the treatment eﬀect, and after match-
ing which corresponds to the actual treatment eﬀect. The change indicates the selection
eﬀect. As can be noted in the table, the diﬀerences in the corporate governance approaches
often diminish signiﬁcantly when controlling for the selection eﬀect. However, they con-
tinue to be still substantial in various cases. When we look, for example, at voting rights
and take international independent VCs as the treatment group and bank-dependent VCs
23As the results are broadly the same for both subgroups when balancing is achieved, we will not make
this further distinction in what follows. Details about the diﬀerences can be seen in table 9.
24as the control group, then we observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the mean of the categorial
variable voting rights of 1.243. After matching, this diﬀerence reduces while remaining
signiﬁcant. To be more precise, it drops to 0.709 with tied nearest neighbor matching
with the propensity scores based on the pairwise probit model, to 0.936 with Gaussian
kernel matching and the mentioned propensity scores, to 0.783 with tied nearest neighbor
matching with the propensity scores based on the multinomial probit model and ﬁnally,
to 0.949 with Gaussian kernel matching and these last mentioned propensity scores. This
means that the results are very robust indicating that for ﬁrms which are ﬁnanced by in-
ternational independent VCs, these VCs have signiﬁcantly more voting rights than would
have bank-dependent VCs ﬁnancing these ﬁrms. Without controlling for the selection ef-
fect, this diﬀerence is even more pronounced what shows us that part of the observed
diﬀerence in the behavior between these two VC types has to be attributed to selection
eﬀects whereas a substantial part actually ascribes to diﬀerences in the corporate gover-
nance approach. In what follows, we will therefore have a closer look at these diﬀerences
for all the key contracting elements as well as the comparison of all VC types.
First, we will analyze the diﬀerences between public VCs and the other VC types.
With respect to active intervention mechanisms as well as structural veto rights, we ob-
serve signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the corporate governance approaches between public VCs
and the other VC types whereby the latter one is less pronounced. On the contrary, for
liquidation rights, these diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant. As concerns operational veto rights,
signiﬁcance is only given for the diﬀerences between public VCs and independent VCs.
Interestingly the diﬀerences between public and bank-dependent VCs tend to grow for
intervention mechanisms after controlling for selection eﬀects whereas there is hardly any
change as concerns structural veto rights24. When comparing the contracts of public VCs
with the contracts of local independent VCs, we remark a slight decline after matching
with respect to active intervention mechanisms as well as to structural veto rights. As
concerns operational veto rights, we get mixed results: for the ﬁrms ﬁnanced by public
VCs the diﬀerences tend to grow whereas for the ﬁrms ﬁnanced by local independent VCs
the diﬀerences tend to decrease. These results should be handled with precaution, how-
ever. Finally, when comparing the contracts of public VCs and international independent
VCs, we get mixed results and so we are not able to evaluate the impact of the selection
eﬀect.
Second, we will analyze the diﬀerences between bank-dependent VCs and independent
VCs. Here, we get very robust results: the diﬀerences between the diﬀerent contract ele-
24It is important to take into account that the results based on the propensity scores of the multinomial
probit model should be excluded because the propensity score has quite limited power in explaining the
selection of a speciﬁc VC type. Moreover, due to the big loss of observations because of the common
support restriction, the achievement of balancing is not convincing for the incentive mechanism degree
for the comparison PVC vs. BVC when matching is based on the pairwise propensity scores.
25ments reduce substantially. After matching, diﬀerences are almost only signiﬁcant for the
active intervention mechanisms25.
Third, we will look at the diﬀerences between local and international independent
VCs. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence neither before nor after matching with respect to
the strength of the incentive mechanism, operational veto rights as well as liquidation
rights. But we observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to structural veto rights and
voting rights which even tend to grow after matching.
In addition, when looking into the details of our results, especially the distance of the
corporate governance approaches between the diﬀerent VC types, we get further inter-
esting insights. As concerns active intervention mechanisms, the diﬀerences are the most
pronounced whereby the bank-dependent VCs are situated nearly in between public VCs
and local independent VCs. Local independent VCs get the same incentives but hold a
signiﬁcantly lower equity share than do international independent VCs. As concerns veto
rights, we can state that most likely the public VC is the outlier: public VCs have sig-
niﬁcantly less veto rights than independent VCs and the diﬀerence between public and
bank-dependent VCs is signiﬁcant in the case of structural veto rights and higher though
insigniﬁcant in the case of operational veto rights. Due to the small number of observa-
tions, these last results should be handled with precaution, however. In contrast, local
independent and bank-dependent VCs do not behave in a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent way and
only in a slightly diﬀerent way than international independent VCs26.
Finally, if we interpret our empirical evidence against the background of our model, we
gain the following insights. The model points out that diﬀerences only occur in equilibrium
if the advice costs of independent VCs are suﬃciently low. Thus, the observed diﬀerences
in the design of the active intervention mechanisms should be interpreted as a signal of
a relatively mature market. Moreover, in our model, active intervention as well as advice
costs are modelled as dichotomous variables. Therefore, we ﬁnd in our model only diﬀer-
ences between independent VCs and the other VC types. If we interpret, however, our
model more broadly by thinking of expertise and intervention levels as non-dichotomous
variables, we can also explain the diﬀerences between public VCs and bank-dependent
VCs. In addition, we may attribute the diﬀerence between local and international inde-
pendent VCs to the higher expertise of international independent VCs (i.e. their lower
advice costs) and therefore, their possibility to oﬀer more diﬀerentiated contracts. With
respect to control rights, our model only predicts a diﬀerence between public VCs and the
other VC types due to the fact that the ﬁrst ones are confronted with prohibitively high
25Note that the results with respect to control rights show sometimes signiﬁcant diﬀerences, however,
the results are not robust. Moreover, the diﬀerences are rather small.
26The diﬀerences between local and international independent VCs (and with some methods between
bank-dependent and international independent) are only signiﬁcant in the case of structural veto rights.
26costs of control. In our data, the major diﬀerence lies, indeed, between public VCs and
the other VC types and we only observe diﬀerences between international independent
VCs and local independent as well as bank-dependent VCs as to structural veto rights.
If we again assumed a non-dichotomous variable for control eﬀort, these diﬀerences could
be easily explained, however.
To conclude, we think that this study has shown that the major diﬀerence between
the diﬀerent VC types does not lie in the handling of control rights but rather in the
implementation of active intervention mechanisms. As expected, the involvement of the
VC and therefore, the use of contract elements which guarantee this involvement, increases
with the know-how of the VC. Speaking with the results of our model, these diﬀerences
in the corporate governance approaches should be evaluated positively as they may be a
signal for a high level of expertise of the independent VCs in the market.
7 Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to identify the causes of the observed diﬀerences in contract
design between VC types, i.e. to disentangle ﬁrm selection eﬀects and actual diﬀerences in
the corporate governance approaches. Therefore, in a ﬁrst step, we constructed a stylized
model in which entrepreneurs choose a speciﬁc type of VC which, in turn, oﬀers pooling or
separating contracts. We then showed that, in equilibrium, VCs oﬀer separating contracts,
i.e. ﬁrm-type speciﬁc contracts, which may present diﬀerences in the corporate governance
approaches or not. To be more precise, in our model, the most innovative projects are
always ﬁnanced by independent venture capitalists whereas the least innovative projects
are ﬁnanced by public VCs. As concerns the ﬁnancing of projects with an intermediate
level of innovativeness, however, they may be ﬁnanced either by independent VCs or bank-
dependent VCs according to the cost structure of the latter ones. Thereby, the corporate
governance approaches diﬀer among the VC types for low eﬀort costs of the VCs, i.e. in
mature markets, but do not show any diﬀerences for higher eﬀort costs, i.e. less developed
VC markets.
In a second step, we analyzed these issues empirically using a hand-collected data set
based on contract details between diﬀerent VC types and their portfolio ﬁrms. We found
that there exists a crucial market segmentation between the diﬀerent VC types conﬁrming
our model: public VCs rather ﬁnance less innovative projects for which the need of VC
expertise is low and for which it is especially diﬃcult to obtain outside ﬁnance; bank-
dependent VCs also ﬁnance rather less innovative projects but, to the contrary, these
ﬁrms exhibit low risk, i.e. their tangibility of assets is higher and more frequently, they
obtained outside ﬁnance before. In contrast, independent VCs rather ﬁnance more innova-
27tive projects. In addition, we found that for similar ﬁrms, the VC’s corporate governance
approaches diﬀer signiﬁcantly: independent VCs use signiﬁcantly more contract mecha-
nisms which induce active intervention than do bank-dependent VCs which, in turn, use
signiﬁcantly more of these mechanisms than do public VCs. As far as control mechanisms
are concerned, the diﬀerences are less pronounced for veto rights and nearly non-existent
for liquidation rights.
To sum up, we can say that in Germany, VC types diﬀer with respect to two aspects:
on the one hand, they choose diﬀerent kinds of ﬁrms but on the other hand, they also
apply diﬀerent corporate governance approaches. This result has important implications
for further research and especially for the comparison of diﬀerent VC markets as it shows
that it is important to keep in mind the composition of the VC market. Indeed, one should
compare the corporate governance approaches of one speciﬁc type of VC ﬁnancing similar
ﬁrms in both countries in order to identify the pure corporate governance diﬀerences and
disentangle them from ﬁrm selection eﬀects as well as market composition eﬀects result-
ing from the diﬀerent objective functions and characteristics of the VC types. When we
compare the German and the US VC market, for example, we can observe strong diﬀer-
ences in contract design between both countries. Though when confronting the contracts
of German independent VCs with the US contracts (which are mainly of VCs operat-
ing independently), these diﬀerences are not crucial anymore. Thus, in this case, market
composition eﬀects seem to be much more important than actual VC eﬀects.
28References
A. Bascha and U. Walz. Financing practices in the German venture capital industry: An
empirical assessment. CFS Working Paper No. 2002/08, 2002.
E. Berkovitch and O. S. Levy. The choice between sources of ﬁnancing and rate of return
inequality. mimeo, 2004.
C. Bienz and J. Hirsch. The dynamics of venture capital contracts. Working Paper, 2005.
C. Bienz and U. Walz. Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts:
An empirical analysis. Working Paper, 2005.
J. Birkinshaw, R. van Basten Batenburg, and G. Murray. Corporate Venturing: The state
of the art and the prospects for the future. London Business School, Centre for the
Network Economy, 2002.
R. Blundell and M. Costa Dias. Alternative approaches to evaluation in empirical mi-
croeconomics. Portuguese Economic Journal, 1:91–115, 2002.
C. Casamatta. Financing and advising: Optimal ﬁnancial contracts with venture capital-
ists. Journal of Finance, 58:2059–2086, 2003.
T. Chemmanur and Z. Chen. Angels, venture capitalists, and entrepreneurs: A dynamic
model of private equity ﬁnancing. mimeo, 2003.
H. W. Chesbrough. Making sense of corporate venture capital. Harvard Business Review,
pages 4–11, 2002.
J.E. De Bettignies and G. Chemla. Corporate venture capital: The upside of failure and
competition for talent, 2003. mimeo.
M. Fr¨ olich. Programme evaluation with multiple treatments. Journal of Economic Sur-
veys, 18:181–224, 2004.
P. Gompers and J. Lerner. The determinants of corporate venture capital success: Or-
ganizational structure, incentives, and complementarities. In Randall Morck, editor,
Concentrated Ownership, pages 17–50. University of Chicago Press for the National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.
T. Hellmann. A theory of strategic venture investing. Journal of Financial Economics,
64:285–314, 2002.
29T. Hellmann, L. Lindsey, and M. Puri. Building relationships early: banks in venture
capital. Working Paper, 2004.
J. Hirsch. Public policy and venture capital ﬁnanced innovation: A contract design ap-
proach. Working Paper, 2005.
A. Ichino. The problem of causality in the analysis of educational choices and labor market
outcomes. Unpublished Slides for Lectures, 2002.
G. W. Imbens. The role of the propensity score in estimating dose response functions.
Biometrika, 87:706–710, 2000.
S. Kaplan, F. Martel, and P. Str¨ omberg. How do legal diﬀerences and learning aﬀect
ﬁnancial contracts? Unpublished Working Paper, 2003.
S. Kaplan and P. Str¨ omberg. Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An
empirical analysis of venture capital contracts. The Review of Economic Studies, 70:
281–316, 2003.
S. Kaplan and P. Str¨ omberg. Characteristics, contracts, and actions: Evidence from ven-
ture capitalist analyses. Journal of Finance, 59:2177–2210, 2004.
A. Landier. Start-up ﬁnancing: From banks to venture capital. mimeo, 2004.
M. Lechner. Identiﬁcation and estimation of causal eﬀects of multiple treatments un-
der the conditional independence assumption. In M. Lechner and F. Pfeiﬀer, editors,
Econometric Evaluations Of Active Labor Market Policies in Europe. Physica/Springer,
Heidelberg, 2001.
M. Lechner. Program heterogeneity and propensity score matching: An application to the
evaluation of active labor market policies. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84:
205–220, 2002.
J. Lerner. When bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs: The design of public venture capital
programmes. Economic Journal, 112:F73–F84, 2002.
J. Lerner and A. Schoar. Transaction structures in the developing world: Evidence from
private equity. Journal of Finance, forthcoming, 2005.
OECD. Government Programmes for Venture Capital. OECD, 1996.
G. Rindermann. The performance of venture-backed IPOs on Europe’s new stock markets:
Evidence from France, Germany and the UK. In G. Giudici and P. Roosenboom, editors,
30The Rise and Fall of Europe’s New Stock Markets, Chap. 10, volume Vol. 10 of Advances
in Financial Economics Series. Elsevier, 2005.
Y. Riyanto and A. Schwienbacher. On the strategic use of corporate venture ﬁnan-cing
for securing demand. National University of Singapore, Working Paper, No. 0109, 2001.
P. R. Rosenbaum and D. B. Rubin. The central role of the propensity score in observa-
tional studies for causal eﬀects. Biometrika, 70:41–55, 1983.
K.M. Schmidt. Convertible securities and venture capital ﬁnance. Journal of Finance,
58:1139–1166, 2003.
O. Secrieru and M. Vigneault. Public venture capital and entrepreneurship. Working
Paper No. 2004-10, 2004.
B. Sianesi. Diﬀerential eﬀects of Swedish active labour market programmes for unem-
ployed adults during the 1990s. Working Paper Series W01/25, 2003.
R. Siegel, E. Siegel, and I.C. MacMillan. Corporate venture capitalists: autonomy, obsta-
cles and performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 3:233–247, 1988.
B. W. Silverman. Density estimation for statistics and data analysis. Chapman & Hall,
London, 1996.
T. Tykvova and U. Walz. Are IPOs of diﬀerent VCs diﬀerent? mimeo, 2005.
M. Ueda. Banks versus venture capital: Project evaluation, screening, and expropriation.
Journal of Finance, 59:601–621, 2004.
F. Vaillancourt. Labour-sponsored venture capital funds in Canada: Institutional aspects,
tax expenditures, and employment creation. In P. Halpers, editor, Finan-cing Growth
in Canada. Industry Canada Research Series, University of Calgary, 1997.
318 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Ad 1) i) Since advice is essential for θ1-projects and since C(¯ a)BV C = C(¯ a)PV C = ∞,
neither PVCs nor BVCs will provide advice. Because p(θ1,0,c) = 0 ∀c monitoring does
not pay either.
ii) For the IVC, it never pays to monitor without providing advice since p(θ1,0,c) = 0 ∀c.
However, providing advice (in the absence of monitoring) for θ1-projects which have chosen
a θm-contract may pay oﬀ for the IVC if
w(θm)IV C[1 − p(θ1,¯ a,0)] + ¯ w(θm)IV Cp(θ1,¯ a,0) − I − e ≥ w(θm)IV C − I
Inserting the proposed equilibrium pay-oﬀ structure for the IVC (see 14) and replacing
¯ w(θ1)IV C, we get the ﬁrst inequality stated in 1ii) in Lemma 1.
Monitoring (with the simultaneous provision of advice) θ1-projects with θm-contracts
pays from the point of view of the IVC if
w(θm)IV C[1 − p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)] + ¯ w(θm)IV Cp(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − I − k − e ≥
w(θm)IV C[1 − p(θ1,¯ a,0)] + ¯ w(θm)IV Cp(θ1,¯ a,0) − I − e
Note that if this condition holds, it is straightforward to show that providing advice always
pays oﬀ. Inserting once again the proposed equilibrium pay-oﬀ structure for the IVC (see
14) and replacing ¯ w(θ1)IV C, we get the second inequality stated in 1ii) of Lemma 1.
Ad 2) i) Since C(¯ a)BV C = ∞, it never pays for the BVC to provide advice. Monitoring
(in the absence of advice) θ2-projects pays oﬀ if
w(θ2)BV C[1 − p(θ2,0,¯ c)] + [¯ w(θ2)BV C + B]p(θ2,0,¯ c) − I − αk ≥ w(θ2)BV C − I
This is due to the zero proﬁt-condition for the BVC always the case. Hence, BVCs will
monitor θ2-ﬁrms but provide no advice.
Due to the inﬁnite advice and monitoring costs PVCs do not provide neither advice
nor monitoring.
ii) Monitoring (without advice) a θ2-project which is ﬁnanced with a contract designed
for a θm-project is worthwhile for the IVC if:
[1 − p(θ2,0,¯ c)]w(θm)IV C + p(θ2,0,¯ c)¯ w(θm)IV C − I − k ≥ w(θm)IV C − I
Inserting the respective monetary returns of the IVC in the good state of nature and
taking the zero-proﬁt structure (for the respective contracts) of the IVC into account
yields the ﬁrst inequality depicted in the Lemma.
32Providing advice to θ2-projects (while simultaneously monitoring the ﬁrm) with a
θm-contract pays from the point of view of the IVC if
[1 − p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)]w(θm)IV C + p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)¯ w(θm)IV C − I − k − e ≥
[1 − p(θ2,0,¯ c)]w(θm)IV C + p(θ2,0,¯ c)¯ w(θm)IV C − I − k
With the help of the zero-proﬁt structure described in Proposition 2, we derive the last
inequality of Lemma 1. Note that if this condition holds, it is again straightforward to
show that providing control always pays oﬀ.
Ad 3) Since p(θ3,0,0) = p(θ3,a,c) ∀a,c, it never pays to provide advice or monitor the
projects.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Ad 1) Only with an IVC, advice will be provided for θ1-projects. Given that advice is
essential, p(θ1) would be zero in all other cases. An entrepreneur with a θ1-project
does not have an incentive to prefer a competitively priced BVC contract designed
for θ2-projects against a competitively priced θ1-contract of an IVC if:
[1 − p(θ1,a,c)]Π + p(θ1,a,c)Π(θ1) − I − k − e ≥
Π − w(θ2)BV C
or if
w(θ2)BV C ≥ I + k + e − p(θ1,a,c)[Π(θ1) − Π]
With respect to the PVC-selection, we get the corresponding condition:
w(θ3)PV C ≥ I + k + e − p(θ1,a,c) · [Π(θ1) − Π]
Ad 3) For a θ3-project, it never makes sense to monitor and provide advice independently of
the chosen VC type (see Lemma 1). Given the additional mo-netary beneﬁts, PVCs
can grant higher remaining monetary payoﬀs for the θ3-entrepreneurs, namely:
[1 − p(θ3,0,0)]Π(θ3) + p(θ3,0,0)Π(θ3) − I + P
In the proposed separating equilibrium the other VCs will design their contracts
for the remaining two projects. To select these contracts does not make sense for
θ3-projects for three reasons:
a) These contracts entail compensation for advice and for monitoring (see Lemma
1) which reduces the entrepreneurs payoﬀs.
33b) Since p(θ3,0,0) > p(θ2,a,¯ c) > p(θ1,¯ a,c) ∀a,c, the expected monetary reward
for the VC will be higher if a θ3-project is ﬁnanced with another contract.
c) Competition among PVCs will lead to the transfer of P to the entrepreneurs.
With the other VCs this transfer is smaller or non-existent.
Ad 2)
i) In equilibrium, θ2-projects are never ﬁnanced by a PVC since a PVC would never
monitor these projects (see Lemma 1) leading to p(θ2,a,0) = 0. Hence, the expected
payoﬀ of the entrepreneurs would – after taking the return of the PVC into account
– read as:
Π − w(θ3)
Comparing this with a competitively supplied θm-contract (m = 1,2) reveals (given
our assumptions about the social return of the optimal θm-projects which are as-
sumed to be at least slightly larger than Π) that it never makes sense to select a
PVC.
ii) Comparing the optimally designed and competitively supplied contract for θ2-projects
by an BVC with the one of an IVC we ﬁnd that the payoﬀ of the project with the
former is larger than with the latter if (using Lemma 1)
p(θ2,0,c)[Π(θ2) + B] + [1 − p(θ2,0,c)]Π − I − αk
≥ p(θ2,a,c)Π(θ2) + [1 − p(θ2,a,c)]Π − I − k − e
or
α ≤ 1 +
e
k
+
B · p(θ2,0,c)
k
−
p(θ2,a,c) − p(θ2,0,c)
k
[Π(θ2) − Π] ≡ α1
If that condition holds, the socially optimal contract entails the ﬁnancing of θ2-
projects by BVCs. From Lemma 1, we know that this implies c = c and a = 0.
This conﬁguration is part of a separating equilibrium if θ2-projects do not have
an incentive to choose a contract oﬀered by IVCs designed for θ1-projects (Note
that we showed in ad 1) that θ1-projects do never have an incentive to choose a
BVC contract.). If θ2-entrepreneurs expect IVCs to monitor the ﬁrm but provide
no advice (see Lemma 1), i.e. choose the same eﬀort and control levels as BVCs it
never pays to choose a θ1-contract from an IVC for analogous reasons as outlined
above (see ad 3) arguments a-c). If it is anticipated that IVCs choose a = a and
c = c (see Lemma 1 for the condition that this emerges) sticking with θ2-contracts
34of BVCs requires:
p(θ2,0,c)[Π(θ2) + B] + [1 − p(θ2,0,c)]Π − I − αk
≥ p(θ2,a,c)[Π(θ2) − w(θ1)IV C] + [1 − p(θ2,a,c)][Π − w(θ1)IV C]
With the zero-proﬁt condition for the equilibrium θ1-contract we can rewrite this
condition as
w(θ1)IV C ≤ I + k +
p(θ2,a,c)
p(θ2,a,c) − p(θ1,a,c)
· e −
p(θ1,a,c)
p(θ2,a,c) − p(θ1,a,c)
[(α − 1)k − p(θ2,0,c)B] − p(θ1,a,c)
p(θ2,a,c) − p(θ2,0,c)
p(θ2,a,c) − p(θ1,a,c)
[Π(θ2) − Π]
Inserting α1 into the above inequality allows us to rewrite this inequality as:
w(θ1)IV C ≤ I + k + e
which is always fulﬁlled.
Hence, we have that with α ≤ α1 the contract oﬀered by BVCs forms part of a
separating equilibrium and has the following main property:
I + k + e − p(θ1,a,c)[Π(θ1) − II] ≤ w(θ2)BV C ≤ Π
iii) With α > α1 it is optimal to ﬁnance a θ2-project with an IVC. Such a setting
displays a separating equilibrium if θ1-projects do not have an incentive to
mimic θ2-projects and vice versa.
In case a θ1-project mimics to be a θ2-project and selects the IVC-contract
designed for θ2-projects, three possibilities can arise. The IVC may choose a)
a = a and c = c, b) a = a and c = 0 and ﬁnally c) a = 0 = c.
In case a) mimicking a θ2-project does not pay for θ1-entrepreneurs if:
p(θ1,a,c)Π(θ1) + [1 − p(θ1,a,c)]Π − I − k − e
≥ p(θ1,a,c)[Π(θ1) − w(θ2)IV C] + [1 − p(θ1,a,c)][Π − w(θ2)IV C].
Replacing w(θ2)IV C with the help of the zero-proﬁt conditions allows us to
rewrite the above inequality as
w(θ2)IV C ≥ I + k + e
which can never hold.
Applying the same procedure to case b) yields the following condition:
w(θ2) ≥ I + k + e −
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)[p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)]
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)
[¯ Π(θ1) − Π]
35In addition, we have to note that case b) requires (for a = ¯ a and c = 0 to emerge in
case a θ1-project entrepreneur chooses a θ2-contract) that
I + k + e −
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)
p(θ1,a,c) − p(θ1,a,0)
k ≤ w(θ2)IV C < I + k + e −
p(θ2,a,c)
p(θ1,a,0)
· e
In addition, we need to have an incentive for IVCs to provide advice for θ2-projects
with a θ2-contract (see Lemma 1):
w(θ2)IV C ≤ w(θm)IV C = I + k + e −
p(θ2,a,c)
p(θ2,a,c) − p(θ2,0,c)
· e.
Checking these conditions in detail, we ﬁnd that the following two types of contracts
are feasible
a) For
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)−p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ2,0,¯ c) [k + (I − Π)] ≤ e ≤
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)−p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)−p(θ1,¯ a,0) · k
I + k + e −
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)
k ≤ w(θ2)IV C
≤ I + k + e −
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ2,0,¯ c)
e
b) For e ≤
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)−p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ2,0,¯ c) [k + (I − Π)]:
I + k + e −
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)
k ≤ w(θ2)IV C ≤ Π
This requires that in this case, a separating equilibrium only exists if
e ≤
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)
· k ≡ e1
With case c) we get:
w(θ2) ≥ I + k + e − p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)[¯ Π(θ1) − Π]
This case requires (for a = 0 and c = 0 to emerge in case a θ1-project entrepreneur
chooses a θ2-contract) that
w(θ2)IV C > I + k + e −
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,0)
e
In addition, the above incentive compatibility condition for the optimal contract for
θ1-projects has to hold.
Analyzing these three condition in detail reveals that they – due to 2p(θ1,¯ a,0) >
p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) never hold simultaneously that is there does not exist a separating contract
which induces a = 0 = c.
36It remains to investigate whether it pays for θ2-projects to pretend to be θ1-projects.
Anticipating that the ﬁnancing IVC chooses a = ¯ a and c = ¯ c for θ2-projects even
if a contract designed for θ1-projects has been selected (see Lemma 1 for the rele-
vant condition for this), it never pays for θ2-projects to pretend to be a θ1-project.
Since p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) > p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c), the IVC would earn positive proﬁts while with the θ2-
contract, the IVC just breaks even. Since everything else is the same with a θ2- and
a θ1-contract, the former is deﬁnitely better than the latter for the entrepreneur.
Anticipating an equilibrium contract (i.e. one which just breaks even for the VC) in
which the IVC with a θ2-project chooses a = 0 and c = ¯ c we ﬁnd that the θ2-project
will not pick the θ1-project if:
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)¯ Π(θ2) + Π[1 − p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c)] − I − k − e ≥
p(θ2,0,¯ c)[¯ Π(θ2) − ¯ w(θ1)IV C] + [1 − p(θ1,0,¯ c)][Π(θ2) − w(θ1)IV C]
Using the zero-proﬁt condition gives us:
w(θ1)IV C ≤ I + k + e +
p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)[p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ2,0,¯ c)]
p(θ2,0,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)
[¯ Π(θ2) − Π]
which always holds.
iv-v) As has been shown above, the optimal contract can only be a separating equilibrium
if e ≤ e1. We now check whether with e > e1, a second-best contract provided by
an IVC with a = 0 and c = ¯ c for θ2-projects may display a separating equilibrium.
Before we proceed and check whether such a contract provides a separating equi-
librium we ask whether such a contract (i.e. a contract with no advice but control
for θ2-projects) will be oﬀered by an IVC or a BVC (note that the latter has been
proven above to be a separating equilibrium already). In a competitive equilibrium,
IVCs will provide the contract if:
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
¯ Π(θ2) + B

+ [1 − p(θ2,0,¯ c)]Π − I − αk ≤
p(θ2,0,¯ c)¯ Π(θ2) + [1 − p(θ2,0,¯ c)]Π − I − k
or
α > α2 ≡ 1 +
p(θ2,0,¯ c)B
k
If, however, α ≤ α2, BVCs will oﬀer the contract.
We now proceed and ask whether the second-best contract oﬀered by an IVC is
actually an equilibrium.
In order to do this, we proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst ask, whether the contract
constitutes a separating equilibrium provided that the IVC (having oﬀered a contract
37for θ2 which contains a = 0 and c = ¯ c) sticks to the announced no-advice case. In
the second step, we ask whether the IVC indeed has an incentive to stick to the
no-advice case for θ2-projects initially announced for these projects.
With respect to the ﬁrst step, we can distinguish three subcases: the IVC ﬁnancing
a θ1-project with a θ2-contract chooses a) a = ¯ a and c = ¯ c; b) a = ¯ a and c = 0, and
c) a = 0.
We can immediately exclude the ﬁrst situation as part of a separating equilibrium.
In order to prevent that a θ1-entrepreneur chooses a θ2-project, the θ2 contract must
fulﬁll the following condition:
w(θ2) ≥ I + k +
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ2,0,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)
e
which is never feasible.
In subcase b), the following conditions have to hold to make the proposed contract
a separating equilibrium. First, for θ1-projects with a θ2-contract, choosing a = ¯ a
(with c = 0) and choosing c = 0 must be in the interest of the IVC:
w(θ2)IV C ≤ I + k −
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,0)
e
w(θ2)IV C ≥ I + k −
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)
k
In addition, it must be guaranteed that θ1-projects do not choose θ2-contracts:
(22) w(θ2)IV C ≥
I + k +
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ2,0,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)
e −
p(θ2,0,¯ c)[p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)]
p(θ2,0,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)
[Π(θ1) − Π]
Finally, beside the limited liability condition (w(θ2)IV C ≤ Π) the incentive com-
patibility condition for IVCs ﬁnancing θ2-projects with θ2-contracts to provide no
advice must hold:
w(θ2)IV C ≥ I + k −
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ2,0,¯ c)
· e
An analysis of these conditions reveals that they can only hold simultaneously for
e ≤
p(θ1,¯ a,0)
p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)−p(θ1,¯ a,0)k. That is, in this subcase, a separating equilibrium can only
emerge when the IVC’s costs are suﬃciently low. Thereby, the corresponding con-
tract is the following:
I + k −
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ1,¯ a,0)
k ≤ w(θ2)IV C ≤ I + k −
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,0)
e
38In subcase c) (with a = 0 chosen for θ1-projects choosing a θ2-contract), the respec-
tive conditions are
w(θ2)IV C ≥ I + k −
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,0)
e
the incentive compatibility condition for an IVC to provide a = 0 for a θ1-project
with a θ2-contract;
w(θ2)IV C ≥ I + k + e − p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)[¯ Π(θ1) − Π]
the separation condition ensuring that θ1-entrepreneurs do not pick θ2-projects;
w(θ2)IV C ≥ I + k −
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ2,¯ a,¯ c) − p(θ2,0,¯ c)
e
the incentive compatibility condition ensuring that IVCs actually choose a = 0
for θ2-projects. Last but not least, we have to note the limited liability condition
(w(θ2)IV C ≤ Π).
Analyzing all these conditions reveals that it is always possible to meet them si-
multaneously. That is, a separating equilibrium will emerge with a contract that
ensures that deviating θ1-ﬁrms have to expect a = 0. The corresponding contract is
the following
max[I + k −
p(θ2,0,¯ c)
p(θ1,¯ a,0)
e,I + k + e − p(θ1,¯ a,¯ c)[¯ Π(θ1) − Π] ≤ w(θ2)IV C ≤ Π
In the second step, we have to ask whether any deviations from the θ2-contract with
a = 0 and c = ¯ c as well as zero proﬁts for the VC by choosing a = ¯ a in later stages
may pay and may form an equilibrium. However, this setting can easily be dismissed
as a candidate for an equilibrium with the following argument. Given that deviation
from such a contract is proﬁtable, i.e. it pays for the IVC to choose a = ¯ a this clearly
implies positive proﬁts for the IVC. In this case, however, IVCs, anticipating positive
proﬁts will undercut the initial contract by lowering either w(θ2) and/or ¯ w(θ2). In
any case, the initial contract will be destroyed by the undercutting activities of the
IVCs.
Hence, in a nutshell, we have shown that a second-best contract with a = 0 and
c = ¯ c for θ2-projects is a separating equilibrium for e > e1 and will be provided
by IVCs if α > α2. In this case the separating equilibrium encompasses that the
contract has to give an incentive for the IVC to choose a = 0 for θ1-projects if they
chose a θ2-project. For e > e1 and α ≤ α2, BVCs will provide the θ2-contract with
a = 0 and c = ¯ c. This contracts forms a separating equilibrium as well.
398.3 Tables
Table 1: Sample Selection
-1997 1998 - 2000 2000 - 2004 Total
1 51 102 22 175
10 0 12 4 16
11 0 8 1 9
100 4 16 2 22
1000 1 33 32 66
1001 0 6 3 9
1010 0 1 1 2
1011 0 1 0 1
Total 56 179 65 300
Notes: 1 = Technology Participation Program (KfW/BMWA + KfW/BMTF - Technologie-Beteiligungsprogramm);
10 = ERP-Innovation Program (ERP-Innovationsprogramm (Beteiligungsvariante)); 100 = Guarantee Program
(KfW-Risikokapitalprogramm - Garantien); 1000 = Fund Program (KFW-Risikokapitalprogramm - Fondsﬁ-
nanzierung); and mixes
Table 2: VC Types across Time Periods in Percent (# Observations)
Public VC Bank-dep. VC Local Ind. VC Int. Ind. VC
Complete Sample 13.43% 28.27% 43.11% 15.19%
( 38 ) ( 80 ) ( 122 ) ( 43 )
Period 1 21.43% 42.86% 30.36% 5.36%
(12) (24) (17) (3)
Period 2 11.18% 25.88% 43.53% 19.41%
(19) (43) (74) (33)
Period 3 10.91% 21.82% 56.36% 10.91%
(6) (12) (31) (6)
Table 3: Summary Statistics I: Security Choice
Category Equity Debt & Equity Convertibles Debt
Description Pure Equity Debt> Debt< US Style Convertible Mixes Nonstandard Pure
Equity + LP Equity Equity Equity Debt Debt
Category 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 4 9
Upside Cash Flow Rights X X X X X X X X -
Downside Protection - X X - X X X X X
Change of Control - - X X X - X X X
Cash Flow Rights at Exit X X X X X X X - -
Voting Rights X X X X - X X - -
51 85 157 20 11 10 16 11 96
Total Percentage 29% 38% 8% 23%
Notes: We report the VC’s security choice which is categorized according to the indicated ﬁve characteristics. We were confronted
with 7 missing values.
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42Table 6: Correlation Matrix for the Complete Sample and the Diﬀerent Subsamples
Diﬀerent Proxies for Development Stage and Fixed Asset Ratio
Early stage Fin. prod. Break Even Aud. Bal. Sheet FAR
Early Stage 1.0000
Finished Product -0.4164* 1.0000
Break Even -0.5798* 0.3038* 1.0000
Audited Balance Sheet -0.4179* 0.4726* 0.4165* 1.0000
Fixed Asset Ratio -0.2640* 0.2086* 0.2551* 0.4654* 1.0000
Correlations between the Variables Used
Complete Sample
Fin. prod. FAR Prev. Outs. Fin. Rep. E G. Ind. P. 1 P. 2
Finished Product 1.0000
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.2086* 1.0000
Previous Outside Finance 0.3135* 0.4419* 1.0000
Repeat Entrepreneur -0.0060 0.0115 0.0521 1.0000
Growth Industries -0.1911* -0.1911* -0.1133 -0.0396 1.0000
Period 1 0.0024 0.0623 0.0139 -0.1178* -0.1291* 1.0000
Period 3 0.0374 0.0554 0.1997* 0.0582 0.0220 -0.2420* 1.0000
Subsample Public VC - Bank-dep. VC
Fin. prod. FAR Prev. Outs. Fin. Rep. E G. Ind. P. 1 P. 2
Finished Product 1.0000
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.1580 1.0000
Previous Outside Finance 0.4395* 0.4462* 1.0000
Repeat Entrepreneur -0.0732 0.0267 -0.0752 1.0000
Growth Industries -0.1423 -0.0854 -0.2345* -0.1176 1.0000
Period 1 -0.1215 -0.0764 0.0243 -0.1773* 0.0194 1.0000
Period 3 0.0060 -0.0634 0.0243 0.0788 0.0834 -0.2811* 1.0000
Subsample Public VC - Local independent VC
Fin. prod. FAR Prev. Outs. Fin. Rep. E G. Ind. P. 1 P. 2
Finished Product 1.0000
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.2792* 1.0000
Previous Outside Finance 0.2132* 0.4361* 1.0000
Repeat Entrepreneur -0.1050 -0.0918 0.0566 1.0000
Growth Industries -0.1107 -0.2116* 0.0435 0.0184 1.0000
Period 1 -0.0030 0.1169 0.0188 -0.0247 -0.1378* 1.0000
Period 3 0.0732 0.0962 0.2566* -0.0384 0.0180 -0.2581* 1.0000
Subsample Public VC - International independent VC
Fin. prod. FAR Prev. Outs. Fin. Rep. E G. Ind. P. 1 P. 2
Finished Product 1.0000
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.4135* 1.0000
Previous Outside Finance 0.1479 0.2627* 1.0000
Repeat Entrepreneur 0.0104 -0.1825 0.0649 1.0000
Growth Industries -0.0591 -0.2813* 0.0451 -0.0899 1.0000
Period 1 -0.1479 0.0517 -0.0137 0.0539 -0.1881* 1.0000
Period 3 0.0181 0.0332 0.2925* 0.0833 0.1056 -0.2084* 1.0000
Subsample Bank-dep. VC - Local independent VC
Fin. prod. FAR Prev. Outs. Fin. Rep. E G. Ind. P. 1 P. 2
Finished Product 1.0000
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.1562* 1.0000
Previous Outside Finance 0.3613* 0.4676* 1.0000
Repeat Entrepreneur -0.0359 - 0.0547 - 0.0504 - 1.0000 - - -
Growth Industries -0.2345* - -0.1938* –0.1805* - 0.0054 - 1.0000 - -
Period 1 0.0519 0.0566 0.0044 -0.1930* -0.1054 1.0000
Period 3 0.0428 0.0433 0.1596* 0.0537 -0.0098 -0.2624* 1.0000
Subsample Bank-dep. VC - International independent VC
Fin. prod. FAR Prev. Outs. Fin. Rep. E G. Ind. P. 1 P. 2
Finished Product 1.0000
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.1451 1.0000
Previous Outside Finance 0.4053* 0.4450* 1.0000
Repeat Entrepreneur 0.0958 0.1425 0.0526 1.0000
Growth Industries -0.2756* -0.1718* -0.2478* -0.1044 1.0000
Period 1 -0.0056 -0.0077 0.0305 -0.2604* -0.1068 1.0000
Period 3 0.0008 0.0013 0.1414 0.2041* -0.0158 -0.2267* 1.0000
Subsample Local independent VC - International independent VC
Fin. prod. FAR Prev. Outs. Fin. Rep. E G. Ind. P. 1 P. 2
Finished Product 1.0000
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.2653* 1.0000
Previous Outside Finance 0.2192* 0.4500* 1.0000
Repeat Entrepreneur 0.0104 -0.0052 0.1300 1.0000
Growth Industries -0.2073* -0.2767* -0.0210 0.0588 1.0000
Period 1 0.0895 0.1855* -0.0106 -0.0912 -0.1666* 1.0000
Period 3 0.0743 0.1614* 0.2992* 0.0552 -0.0769 -0.2032* 1.0000
Notes: Pairwise correlations are indicated. ∗ refers to a signiﬁcance level of 10% or lower.
43Table 7: The Determinants of the Choice of a Speciﬁc VC Type:
Pairwise Univariate Probit Regressions
Dependent variable Public VC - Bank-dep. VC Public VC - Local ind. VC Public VC - Int. ind. VC
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Finished Product .047102 0.16
Previous Outside Finance 1.21089 2.87 .8045787 1.85
Fixed Asset Ratio -1.903705 -1.65
Dummy Repeat E -.8791857 -1.99
Growth Industries .0457502 0.14 .8951655 2.92 .5313493 1.29
Period 1 -.3960566 -0.96 -.2537756 -0.64 -1.41504 -2.76
Period 3 -.4000993 -0.96 -.285756 -0.82 -.582316 -1.08
Constant .246049 0.89 .0348569 0.12 .6658597 1.59
No of Obs. 72 103 57
Wald /χ2 11.20 12.61 13.76
Prob. 0.0245 0.0273 0.0172
Pseudo R2 0.1050 0.1150 0.2376
Log Likelihood -42.146486 -51.498725 -30.05986
Dependent variable Bank-dep. VC - Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC - Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC - Int. ind. VC
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Finished Product .0076909 0.04 -.335661 -1.18 -.2054815 -0.83
Fixed Asset Ratio -.2216757 -0.68 -1.504153 -2.75 -1.224041 -2.44
Growth Industries .8253005 3.79 .4717387 1.56 -.4023569 -1.36
Period 1 -.3521593 -1.34 -1.165536 -2.73 -.5834417 -1.33
Period 3 .3864149 1.48 -.0361875 -0.10 -.3210557 -1.06
Constant -.2287669 -0.92 -.1085277 -0.33 .0132732 0.04
No of Obs. 174 105 137
Wald /χ2 21.89 22.19 11.94
Prob. 0.0005 0.0005 0.0356
Pseudo R2 0.1063 0.1931 0.0649
Log Likelihood -105.14277 -53.352979 -71.778859
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors. Dependent variables are diﬀerent dummy variables
which allow to compare VC types pairwisely. The respective dependent dummy variable is indicated.
Table 8: The Determinants of the Choice of a Speciﬁc VC Type:
Multinomial Probit Regression
OC Coef. z
Outcome Category 1
Finished Product -.2451927 -0.82
Fixed Asset Ratio -.9317131 -1.47
Growth Industries -1.020258 -3.26
Period 1 .5357527 1.46
Period 3 -.1883737 -0.49
Constant .014885 0.04
Outcome Category 2
Finished Product .0367025 0.14
Fixed Asset Ratio .2562786 0.57
Growth Industries -1.036111 -3.84
Period 1 .5075815 1.53
Period 3 -.4339993 -1.32
Constant .2390522 0.79
Outcome Category 4
Finished Product -.3029956 -1.03
Fixed Asset Ratio -1.320428 -2.41
Growth Industries -.4526247 -1.42
Period 1 -.680617 -1.47
Period 3 -.4452425 -1.23
Constant .0044159 0.01
No of Obs. 241
Wald /χ2 47.25
Prob. 0.0000
Log Likelihood -282.14457
Notes: Multinomial probit regression with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is the categorial
variable VCTYPE which takes value one when a public VC is chosen, value two with a bank-dependent VC,
value three with a local independent VC and value four with an international independent VC. The chosen
base category is category 3. OC refers to the speciﬁc outcome categories.
44Table 9: Comparison of the ATT Obtained by Diﬀerent Matching Methods
Incentive Mechanism Degree
Control Group vs. Treatment Group Before Matching (1) After NN 1 After GK 1 Before Matching (2) After NN 2 After GK 2
Public VC vs. Bank-dep. VC 0.630** [0.602*** [0.607** ] 0.448* 0.401 0.417**
Bank-dep. VC vs. Public VC -0.630** -0.969** -0.654*** -0.448* -0.677** -0.413*
Public VC vs. Local ind. VC 1.566*** [1.523*** ] 1.529*** 1.373*** [1.471***] 1.259***
Local ind. VC vs. Public VC -1.566*** -1.156*** -1.253*** -1.373*** [-1.106***] -0.994***
Public VC vs. Int. ind. VC 1.563*** [1.734***] 1.672*** 1.658*** 1.863*** 1.649***
Int. ind. VC vs. Public VC -1.563*** -2.174*** -1.910*** -1.658*** -1.615*** -1.689***
Bank-dep. VC vs. Local ind. VC 0.925*** 0.583** 0.673*** 0.925*** 0.467 0.654**
Local ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -0.925*** -0.446** -0.578*** -0.925*** -0.382 -0.565***
Bank-dep. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 1.210*** 0.843** 1.021*** 1.210*** 0.909** 0.946***
Int. ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -1.210*** [-1.603***] [-1.269***] -1.210*** [-1.476***] [-1.282***]
Local ind. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.284 0.298 0.220 0.284 0.028 0.207
Int. ind. VC vs. Local ind. VC -0.284 [-0.322] [-0.275] -0.284 [-0.076] [-0.183]
Voting Rights
Control Group vs. Treatment Group Before Matching (1) After NN 1 After GK 1 Before Matching (2) After NN 2 After GK 2
Public VC vs. Bank-dep. VC 0.474** 0.589** 0.590*** 0.272 0.160 0.219
Bank-dep. VC vs. Public VC -0.474** -0.769*** -0.595*** -0.272 -0.420 -0.350*
Public VC vs. Local ind. VC 1.268*** 1.206*** 1.193*** 1.134*** [1.205*** ] 1.017***
Local ind. VC vs. Public VC -1.268*** -1.027*** -1.215*** -1.134*** -0.935*** -0.909***
Public VC vs. Int. ind. VC 1.348*** [1.406***] 1.500*** 1.515*** 1.717*** 1.426***
Int. ind. VC vs. Public VC -1.348*** -1.391*** -1.499*** -1.515*** -1.608*** -1.615***
Bank-dep. VC vs. Local ind. VC 0.861*** 0.634*** 0.619*** 0.861*** 0.498*** 0.572***
Local ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -0.861*** -0.780*** -0.796*** -0.861*** -0.747*** -0.789**
Bank-dep. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 1.243*** 0.709*** 0.936*** 1.243*** 0.783*** 0.949***
Int. ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -1.243*** [-1.038***] [-1.110***] -1.243*** [-1.028***] [-1.142***]
Local ind. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.382** 0.498*** 0.372** 0.382** 0.516** 0.369***
Int. ind. VC vs. Local ind. VC -0.382** [-0.373***] [-0.364***] -0.382** [-0.407***] [-0.368***]
Operational Veto Rights
Control Group vs. Treatment Group Before Matching (1) After NN 1 After GK 1 Before Matching (2) After NN 2 After GK 2
Public VC vs. Bank-dep. VC 0.402 0.435 0.437 0.373 0.402 0.370
Bank-dep. VC vs. Public VC -0.402 -0.701 -0.390 -0.373 -0.598 -0.355
Public VC vs. Local ind. VC 0.646* 0.567 0.634* 0.779** [0.790***] 0.726***
Local ind. VC vs. Public VC -0.646* -0.640 -0.844** -0.779** -1.113*** -0.925***
Public VC vs. Int. ind. VC 1.309*** 0.556 [0.971] 1.133*** [1.225** 0.940**
Int. ind. VC vs. Public VC -1.309*** [-0.550] [-0.939**] -1.133*** -0.979** -1.019***
Bank-dep. VC vs. Local ind. VC 0.405 -0.070 0.082 0.405 -0.500 0.060
Local ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC 0.405 -0.584 -0.581* 0.405 -0.687* -0.592*
Bank-dep. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.760** 0.575 0.604 0.760** 0.325 0.585
Int. ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -0.760** [-0.115] [-0.463] -0.760** [-0.161] -0.474
Local ind. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.355 0.673* 0.414 0.355 0.539 0.423
Int. ind. VC vs. Local ind. VC 0.355 [-0.268] [-0.374] -0.355 [-0.390] [-0.400]
Structural Veto Rights
Control Group vs. Treatment Group Before Matching (1) After NN 1 After GK 1 Before Matching (2) After NN 2 After GK 2
Public VC vs. Bank-dep. VC 0.477*** 0.453* 0.470** 0.249* 0.113 0.217
Bank-dep. VC vs. Public VC -0.477*** -0.553*** -0.445*** -0.249* -0.322 -0.301**
Public VC vs. Local ind. VC 0.544*** 0.444** 0.458*** 0.450*** [0.397**] 0.343**
Local ind. VC vs. Public VC -0.544*** -0.235 -0.424*** -0.450*** -0.022 -0.183
Public VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.560*** 0.604* 0.515*** 0.645*** 0.699*** 0.563***
Int. ind. VC vs. Public VC -0.560*** -0.571*** -0.571*** - 0.645*** -0.643*** -0.643***
Bank-dep. VC vs. Local ind. VC 0.201** 0.101 0.117 0.201** 0.106 0.096
Local ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -0.201** -0.011 -0.116 -0.201** 0.052 -0.117
Bank-dep. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.397*** 0.194 0.269*** 0.397*** 0.200 0.272***
Int. ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -0.397*** [-0.378***] [-0.378***] -0.397*** [-0.391***] [-0.391***]
Local ind. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.196* 0.371** 0.209** 0.196* 0.371** 0.209***
Int. ind. VC vs. Local ind. VC -0.196* [-0.211***] [-0.211***] -0.196* [-0.192**] [-0.192***]
Liquidation Rights
Control Group vs. Treatment Group Before Matching (1) After NN 1 After GK 1 Before Matching (2) After NN 2 After GK 2
Public VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -0.119 [-0.086] [-0.065] -0.060 0.051 -0.008
Bank-dep. VC vs. Public VC 0.119 [0.036] 0.069 0.060 -0.024 0.053
Public VC vs. Local ind. VC 0.050 -0.015 -0.008 0.062 [0.021 ] 0.001
Local ind. VC vs. Public VC -0.050 -0.060 -0.067 -0.062 -0.097 -0.063
Public VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.077 0.050 0.027 0.120* 0.073 0.045
Int. ind. VC vs. Public VC -0.077 -0.087 [-0.094] -0.120* -0.133 -0.060
Bank-dep. VC vs. Local ind. VC 0.122** 0.064 0.096 0.122** 0.084 0.097
Local ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -0.122** [-0.154] -0.092 - 0.122** -0.136* -0.091
Bank-dep. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.180** 0.137 0.172** 0.180** 0.141 0.171**
Int. ind. VC vs. Bank-dep. VC -0.180** -0.137 [-0.118] -0.180** [-0.135] [-0.116]
Local ind. VC vs. Int. ind. VC 0.058 0.036 0.055 0.058 0.130 0.054
Int. ind. VC vs. Local ind. VC -0.058 [0.012] [-0.027] -0.058 [0.000] [-0.046]
Notes: NN relates to tied nearest neighbor and GK to Gaussian kernel matching. The numbers refer to the two diﬀerent speciﬁcations
in order to compute the propensity scores: 1 = propensity score based on pairwise univariate probit models; 2 = propensity scores
based on multinomial probit models. The bandwidth of the Gaussian is chosen by the rule of thumb of Silverman (1986) which
is given by h = 0,9An− 1
5 whereby A = min [standard deviation; interquartile range/1.34] and n the number of observations for
the respective subsamples. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ refer to a signiﬁcance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are obtained by
bootstrapping with 50 repetitions. Indications in parenthesis [] signal that the balancing property is not fulﬁlled, i.e. at least the
mean of one covariate diﬀers at the 10% level between treated and controls.
45Table 10: Indicators of Matching Quality 1 (Propensity Scores of the Pairwise Probit
Models)
Treatment Comparison Probit-ps-R2 Probit-ps-R2 Pr > χ2 Pr > χ2 Med. (max.) Med. (max.) % loss due
(No. of obs.) (No. of obs.) before after before after bias bias due to
before after CS
Incentive mechanism degree
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.105 0.057 0.042 0.227 14.0 (74.1) 3.5 (7.0) 15.28
GK (46) (26) 0.055 0.250 0.3 (4.8)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC -0.000 1.000 0.0 (0.0) 0.00
GK (26) (46) 0.003 0.987 5.7 (8.2)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.114 0.017 0.022 0.783 21.9 (69.6) 3.3 (4.1) 7.84
GK (76) (26) 0.017 0.789 4.7 (11.9)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.003 0.996 7.8 (9.8) 0.00
GK (26) (76) 0.002 0.997 4.2 (10.3)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.238 0.100 0.002 0.340 52.4 (69.4) 13.3 (46.6) 24.56
GK (30) (27) 0.113 0.138 13.8 (19.9)
NN Public VC Int. ind. VC 0.070 0.599 25.2 (43.3) 7.02
GK (27) (30) 0.048 0.579 7.5 (26.4)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.105 0.005 0.000 0.955 29.3 (68.1) 2.5 (8.5) 1.73
GK (102) (71) 0.005 0.939 5.5 (17.1)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.001 0.998 3.4 (6.6) 0.00
GK (71) (102) 0.002 0.993 4.2 (9.6)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.193 0.009 0.000 0.980 63.0 (66.2) 6.2 (8.0) 0.00
GK (34) (71) 0.002 0.997 4.4 (6.7)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.106 0.014 20.9 (35.7) 19.05
GK (71) (34) 0.062 0.117 6.6 (11.4)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.067 0.037 0.068 0.506 27.6 (49.7) 11.8 (20.0) 0.00
GK (34) (102) 0.003 0.988 3.6 (7.6)
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.035 0.278 5.6 (11.8) 12.50
GK (102) (34) 0.040 0.183 3.3 (8.6)
Voting rights
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.086 0.040 0.101 0.444 9.7 (66.0) 3.6 (7.1) 11.76
GK (42) (26) 0.038 0.476 4.0 (7.4)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC -0.000 1.000 0.0 (0.0) 0.00
GK (26) (42) 0.004 0.987 6.3 (8.5)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.114 0.017 0.022 0.783 21.9 (69.6) 3.3 (4.1) 7.84
GK (76) (26) 0.017 0.789 4.7 (11.9)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.003 0.996 7.8 (9.8) 0.00
GK (26) (76) 0.002 0.997 4.2 (10.3)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.238 0.100 0.002 0.340 52.4 (69.4) 13.3 (46.6) 24.56
GK (30) (27) 0.113 0.138 13.8 (23.1)
NN Public VC Int. ind. VC 0.070 0.599 25.2 (43.3) 7.02
GK (27) (30) 0.048 0.579 7.5 (26.4)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.093 0.005 0.001 0.966 25.1 (64.2) 2.5 (8.5) 1.79
GK (101) (67) 0.004 0.963 4.2 (15.5)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.002 0.998 3.6 (7.0) 0.00
GK (67) (101) 0.002 0.996 2.8 (9.2)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.174 0.010 0.001 0.975 55.4 (64.6) 6.1 (9.4) 0.00
GK (33) (67) 0.002 0.997 3.9 (6.1)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.104 0.021 21.3 (37.0) 18.00
GK (67) (33) 0.061 0.143 5.5 (14.8)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.064 0.038 0.087 0.496 24.2 (48.5) 12.1 (20.7) 0.00
GK (33) (101) 0.003 0.989 3.1 (9.8)
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.036 0.268 5.4 (11.7) 12.69
GK (101) (33) 0.041 0.182 3.9 (8.0)
Operational Veto rights
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.057 0.041 0.353 0.517 16.8 (50.2) 4.5 (9.2) 10.53
GK (33) (24) 0.041 0.526 3.4 (5.3)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC 0.000 1.000 0.0 (0.0) 0.00
GK (24) (33) 0.005 0.980 3.4 (16.2)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.096 0.034 0.117 0.647 16.2 (65.1) 0.0 (6.8) 8.33
GK (48) (24) 0.022 0.828 4.4 (9.1)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.010 0.975 9.5 (11.8) 0.00
GK (24) (48) 0.005 0.991 8.2 (9.0)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.475 0.177 0.000 0.361 55.3 (72.0) 0.00 (23.4) 19.51
GK (17) (24) 0.298 0.008 30.1 (46.7)
NN Public VC Int. ind. VC 0.318 0.032 76.7 (91.8) 9.76
GK (24) (17) 0.278 0.008 44.9 (73.1)
46Treatment Comparison Probit-ps-R2 Probit-ps-R2 Pr > χ2 Pr > χ2 Med. (max.) Med. (max.) % loss due
(No. of obs.) (No. of obs.) before after before after bias bias due to
before after CS
Operational Veto rights (cont.)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.083 0.014 0.021 0.863 9.6 (66.5) 4.2 (6.4) 3.45
GK (66) (50) 0.004 0.983 3.3 (5.6)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.021 0.767 4.8 (31.7) 0.00
GK (50) (66) 0.006 0.967 9.6 (11.0)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.208 0.018 0.004 0.967 52.6 (64.3) 10.5 (27.1) 0.00
GK (20) (50) 0.021 0.849 8.6 (23.9)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.166 0.012 35.0 (54.3) 14.29
GK (50) (20) 0.084 0.153 17.9 (35.9)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.102 0.017 0.089 0.937 37.7 (54.7) 10.4 (11.8) 0.00
GK (20) (66) 0.017 0.852 8.3 (15.7
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.117 0.021 5.1 (19.1) 29.07
GK (66) (20) 0.108 0.030 7.1 (12.2)
Structural Veto rights
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.068 0.041 0.222 0.472 15.6 (56.9) 3.9 (8.2) 11.29
GK (37) (25) 0.041 0.484 5.9 (7.8)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC 0.000 1.000 0.0 (0.0) 0.00
GK (25) (37) 0.003 0.995 2.8 (8.8)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.094 0.022 0.072 0.724 19.3 (59.4) 3.8 (4.6) 8.60
GK (68) (25) 0.023 0.714 7.0 (11.4)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.003 0.997 8.2 (9.9) 0.00
GK (25) (68) 0.001 0.999 1.7 (9.0)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.215 0.087 0.008 0.459 40.0 (73.4) 13.1 (45.3) 22.64
GK (28) (25) 0.099 0.229 17.4 (24.9)
NN Public VC Int. ind. VC 0.075 0.592 19.1 (46.1) 7.55
GK (25) (28) 0.048 0.621 7.4 (19.0)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.064 0.010 0.025 0.872 17.0 (54.1) 2.7 (15.7) 2.00
GK (92) (58) 0.003 0.990 3.7 (11.1)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.003 0.992 4.2 (10.3) 0.00
GK (58) (92) 0.001 0.999 1.1 (6.9)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.148 0.015 0.005 0.945 47.0 (58.0) 8.1 (12.9) 0.00
GK (31) (58) 0.002 0.998 4.4 (6.5)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.097 0.050 27.6 (35.7) 14.61
GK (58) (31) 0.046 0.346 8.2 (14.1)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.064 0.015 0.116 0.900 22.6 (49.4) 10.3 (14.3) 0.00
GK (31) (92) 0.002 0.997 1.9 (8.4)
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.041 0.246 2.5 (13.2) 13.01
GK (92) (31) 0.042 0.212 4.6 (6.0)
Liquidation rights
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.105 0.057 0.042 0.227 14.0 (74.1) 3.5 (7.0) 15.28
GK (46) (26) 0.055 0.250 0.3 (4.8)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC -0.000 1.000 0.0 (0.0) 0.00
GK (26) (46) 0.003 0.987 5.7 (8.2)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.110 0.014 0.027 0.849 21.3 (68.9) 3.3 (4.1) 6.93
GK (75) (26) 0.014 0.852 4.8 (11.9)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.003 0.996 7.9 (9.7) 0.00
GK (26) (75) 0.002 0.997 4.4 (10.2)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.272 0.093 0.001 0.398 54.7 (68.6) 17.3 (34.3) 25.00
GK (29) (27) 0.134 0.086 15.1 (32.7)
NN Public VC Int. ind. VC 0.070 0.599 26.4 (44.7) 7.14
GK (27) (29) 0.074 0.338 14.6 (45.5)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.104 0.005 0.000 0.966 29.9 (67.5) 2.5 (8.8) 1.74
GK (101) (71) 0.005 0.937 5.2 (17.4)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.001 0.998 3.4(6.6) 0.00
GK (71) (101) 0.002 0.992 4.7 (9.5)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.207 0.009 0.000 0.979 63.3 (70.0) 6.6 (8.5) 0.00
GK (32) (71) 0.004 0.990 4.9 (9.6)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.100 0.022 25.0 (32.1) 19.42
GK (71) (32) 0.061 0.129 7.6 (16.1)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.075 0.025 0.052 0.717 28.0 (54.8) 12.6 (14.3) 0.00
GK (32) (101) 0.005 0.972 3.6 (13.3)
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.039 0.225 8.7 (15.5) 12.78
GK (101) (32) 0.044 0.151 3.3 (12.0)
Notes: The number of observations refers to the number of the complete subsample (out of common support area included).
Diﬀerent measures of the balancing of the variables are indicated for the two matching methods. NN refers to tied nearest
neighbor matching; GK refers to Gaussian kernel matching. Pseudo-R2 results from a probit model with the pairwise VC
dummies as endogenous variables and the respective X variables as exogenous variables. This measure is indicated for the
unmatched as well as the matched sample. Pr > χ2 indicates the p-value of the likelihood-ratio test before and after matching
testing the null hypothesis of joint insigniﬁcance of all the covariates. The standardized bias following Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) is calculated for every covariate. The bias is the diﬀerence in the means of the respective covariate in the unmatched
and matched subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the full subsample. The
median of the standardized bias as well as the maximum values are indicated for the unmatched and the matched subsamples.
The last column indicates the percentage of observations which are lost due to the common support assumption.
47Table 11: Indicators of Matching Quality 2 (P. Scores of the Multinomial Probit Model)
Treatment Comparison Probit-ps-R2 Probit-ps-R2 Pr > χ2 Pr > χ2 Med. (max.) Med. (max.) % loss due
(No. of obs.) (No. of obs.) before after before after bias bias due to
before after CS
Incentive mechanism degree
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.044 0.015 0.333 0.835 9.6 (42.6) 3.1 (15.3) 5.77
GK (71) (33) 0.020 0.717 9.2 (14.7)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC 0.014 0.942 6.3 (20.2) 0.96
GK (33) (71) 0.003 0.993 2.2 (10.0)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.102 0.041 0.009 0.199 22.2 (57.3) 10.1 (23.3) 5.19
GK (102) (33) 0.013 0.795 3.1 (9.9)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.020 0.802 6.4 (21.9) 0.00
GK (33) (102) 0.001 1.000 2.5 (3.7)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.133 0.038 0.030 0.704 29.6 (65.9) 15.1 (23.6) 0.00
GK (34) (33) 0.011 0.959 7.3 (19.8)
NN Public VC Int. ind. VC 0.026 0.856 5.8 (33.5) 4.48
GK (33) (34) 0.026 0.783 9.5 (20.9)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.105 0.007 0.000 0.920 29.3 (68.1) 2.3 (8.4) 5.78
GK (102) (71) 0.010 0.810 3.4 (11.3)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.006 0.955 6.0 (14.1) 0.00
GK (71) (102) 0.001 0.997 2.6 (7.3)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.193 0.008 0.000 0.983 63.0 (66.2) 6.7 (16.1) 0.95
GK (34) (71) 0.003 0.994 4.7 (10.6)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.125 0.006 21.0 (44.6) 18.10
GK (71) (34) 0.060 0.128 5.7 (16.1)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.067 0.005 0.068 0.989 27.6 (49.7) 6.7 (9.7) 0.00
GK (34) (102) 0.004 0.978 3.7 (10.7)
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.060 0.052 2.9 (24.9) 14.71
GK (102) (34) 0.050 0.098 5.7 (7.9)
Voting rights
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.039 0.017 0.423 0.815 4.6 (39.3) 3.5 (16.0) 5.00
GK (67) (33) 0.018 0.777 10.4 (11.2)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC 0.014 0.942 6.3 (20.2) 1.00
GK (33) (67) 0.004 0.989 3.4 (13.5)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.104 0.044 0.008 0.168 42.4 (59.1) 10.2 (24.3) 5.22
GK (101) (33) 0.014 0.764 4.3 (12.4)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.020 0.802 6.5 (21.9) 0.00
GK (33) (101) 0.001 1.000 2.7 (3.1)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.127 0.040 0.041 0.696 28.0 (65.2) 15.5 (24.3) 0.00
GK (33) (33) 0.010 0.970 5.4 (18.4)
NN Public VC Int. ind. VC 0.026 0.861 5.8 (33.4) 9.09
GK (33) (33) 0.026 0.795 9.7 (20.8)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.093 0.007 0.001 0.921 25.1 (64.2) 2.4 (8.4) 5.95
GK (101) (67) 0.008 0.857 1.9 (10.5)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.007 0.939 6.4 (15.3) 0.00
GK (67) (101) 0.001 0.999 3.7 (5.0)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.174 0.016 0.001 0.930 55.4 (64.6) 10.3 (19.6) 1.00
GK (33) (67) 0.003 0.993 4.2 (10.8)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.124 0.009 21.7 (46.0) 17.00
GK (67) (33) 0.059 0.156 7.9 (18.1)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.064 0.005 0.087 0.988 24.2 (48.5) 6.9 (9.9) 0.00
GK (33) (101) 0.005 0.972 3.6 (13.4)
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.064 0.040 4.9 (28.0) 14.93
GK (101) (33) 0.051 0.094 4.5 (11.0)
Operational Veto rights
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.028 0.062 0.701 0.267 10.3 (36.1) 8.9 (34.4) 5.00
GK (50) (30) 0.039 0.505 7.6 (21.9)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC 0.022 0.885 0.8 (27.2) 1.25
GK (30) (50) 0.009 0.964 5.7 (11.9)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.114 0.079 0.018 0.074 31.4 (59.0) 15.2 (35.9) 4.17
GK (66) (30) 0.040 0.380 8.9 (34.3)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.015 0.925 7.3 (16.5) 0.00
GK (30) (66) 0.016 0.833 11.8 (14.6)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.182 0.096 0.032 0.429 38.6 (68.4) 12.9 (44.8) 0.00
GK (20) (30) 0.049 0.634 4.0 (36.7)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.115 0.230 19.5 (45.1) 4.00
GK (30) (20) 0.083 0.333 22.3 (47.9)
48Treatment Comparison Probit-ps-R2 Probit-ps-R2 Pr > χ2 Pr > χ2 Med. (max.) Med. (max.) % loss due
(No. of obs.) (No. of obs.) before after before after bias bias due to
before after CS
Operational Veto rights (cont.)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.083 0.027 0.021 0.629 9.6 (66.5) 7.8 (15.5) 8.62
GK (66) (50) 0.009 0.921 4.3 (12.5)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.013 0.911 10.4 (19.3) 0.00
GK (50) (66) 0.007 0.956 9.4 (14.8)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.208 0.067 0.004 0.633 52.6 (64.3) 10.5 (40.7) 0.00
GK (20) (50) 0.021 0.849 3.5 (24.6)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.156 0.020 34.1 (56.4) 12.86
GK (50) (20) 0.096 0.099 24.2 (35.9)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.102 0.016 0.089 0.954 37.7 (54.7) 13.0 (23.6) 0.00
GK (20) (66) 0.016 0.858 7.9 (16.0)
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.119 0.020 5.6 (18.6) 27.91
GK (66) (20) 0.107 0.030 6.5 (12.4)
Structural Veto rights
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.034 0.031 0.560 0.605 10.1 (36.8) 4.9 (22.4) 5.62
GK (58) (31) 0.030 0.586 14.1 (15.9)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC 0.015 0.937 6.6 (21.6) 1.12
GK (31) (58) 0.003 0.995 5.7 (11.1)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.091 0.055 0.027 0.108 30.0 (46.9) 12.2 (31.4) 4.88
GK (92) (31) 0.019 0.651 9.1 (11.6)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.022 0.788 7.6 (22.7) 0.00
GK (31) (92) 0.004 0.983 3.3 (10.1)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.118 0.058 0.071 0.523 20.2 (68.0) 8.5 (31.4) 0.00
GK (31) (31) 0.013 0.951 8.5 (17.1)
NN Public VC Int. ind. VC 0.029 0.848 4.9 (35.8) 4.84
GK (31) (31) 0.031 0.750 12.4 (22.2)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.064 0.006 0.025 0.947 17.0 (54.1) 3.0 (9.7) 6.67
GK (92) (58) 0.006 0.950 1.5 (8.5)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.009 0.926 7.3 (17.2) 0.00
GK (58) (92) 0.001 0.999 2.3 (5.7)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.148 0.012 0.005 0.964 47.0 (58.0) 13.4 (16.7) 1.12
GK (31) (58) 0.004 0.994 2.5 (12.8)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.107 0.039 27.3 (40.5) 13.48
GK (58) (31) 0.044 0.372 8.5 (16.1)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.064 0.011 0.116 0.948 22.6 (49.4) 6.5 (15.3) 0.00
GK (31) (92) 0.004 0.987 2.7 (12.2)
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.063 0.064 5.5 (24.3) 15.45
GK (92) (31) 0.053 0.109 2.9 (8.8)
Liquidation rights
NN Bank-dep. VC Public VC 0.044 0.015 0.333 0.835 9.6 (42.6) 3.1 (15.3) 5.77
GK (71) (33) 0.020 0.717 9.2 (14.7)
NN Public VC Bank-dep. VC 0.014 0.942 6.3 (20.2) 9.62
GK (33) (71) 0.003 0.993 2.2 (10.0)
NN Local ind. VC Public VC 0.100 0.042 0.010 0.182 22.7 (56.7) 10.1 (24.0) 5.22
GK (101) (33) 0.013 0.794 4.0 (9.8)
NN Public VC Local ind. VC 0.020 0.805 6.4 (21.9) 0.00
GK (33) (101) 0.001 0.999 2.9 (3.6)
NN Int. ind. VC Public VC 0.147 0.032 0.021 0.808 35.0 (64.5) 8.2 (31.4) 0.00
GK (32) (33) 0.015 0.926 7.5 (27.2)
NN Public VC Int. ind. VC 0.026 0.861 6.0 (33.5) 4.62
GK (33) (32) 0.022 0.853 5.9 (16.7)
NN Local ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.104 0.008 0.000 0.900 29.9 (67.5) 2.3 (8.9) 5.81
GK (101) (71) 0.010 0.806 3.1 (10.7)
NN Bank-dep. VC Local ind. VC 0.006 0.955 6.0 (14.1) 0.00
GK (71) (101) 0.002 0.996 2.7 (7.5)
NN Int. ind. VC Bank-dep. VC 0.207 0.012 0.000 0.960 63.3 (70.0) 6.7 (26.4) 0.97
GK (32) (71) 0.005 0.984 5.2 (18.5)
NN Bank-dep. VC Int. ind. VC 0.136 0.004 31.2 (44.9) 18.81
GK (71) (32) 0.060 0.133 10.8 (16.7)
NN Int. ind. VC Local ind. VC 0.075 0.000 0.052 1.000 28.1 (54.8) 0.0 (0.6) 0.00
GK (32) (101) 0.005 0.966 6.2 (12.3)
NN Local ind. VC Int. ind. VC 0.055 0.080 6.0 (19.8) 15.04
GK (101) (32) 0.051 0.094 7.0 (12.8)
Notes: Explanation of indicators see table 10.
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